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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that phrenology shaped the defence argument in the McNaughtan 
trial.  The role of this now-discredited science exemplifies the negotiation of 
scientific, legal and lay knowledge in the early nineteenth century, at a time when 
science was challenging the primacy of lay understandings of insanity.  
Phrenological ideas allowed the defence to privilege medical opinion over lay 
opinion, and propose a model of the mind that could account for McNaughtan’s 
insanity.  This was possible because the medical and professional communities 
accepted some elements of the science.  They applied these principles when 
explaining and verifying insanity in a courtroom setting. 
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Phrenology and the Insanity Defence: Medical Jurisprudence in the 
McNaughtan Trial 
 
The history of the insanity defence is incomplete.  Although phrenology played a 
part in the evolution of the insanity defence in the early nineteenth century, the 
significance of the discipline has not yet been fully explored.  It played a key role in 
the argument before the court in the McNaughtan1 trial, but it hardly appears in the 
standard histories of the defence.  The McNaughtan trial, and the Rules that followed 
it, are considered to be one of the most significant moments in the development of 
the insanity defence.  Adding this now-discredited science back into the history of 
the defence allows for a reinterpretation of the status of phrenology in the early 
nineteenth century.  Phrenology, while now considered a dead end in Western 
scientific thought, was once a prominent belief among the medically trained, the 
professional elite, and among laypersons who wanted to understand their own 
character.  It offered the layperson an easily comprehensible model of the human 
mind.  To medical professionals, particularly those in command of mental asylums, 
phrenology offered an opportunity to emphasise the role of medical expertise in the 
treatment of insanity.  For some in the legal community, phrenology offered the tools 
to understand defendants who appeared sane while performing bizarre crimes. 
 
This thesis argues that phrenology contributed to the insanity defence after being 
adopted by medico-legal theorists who then went on to influence the McNaughtan 
                                                 
1 There are a number of variations of the spelling of McNaughtan in common usage.  
However, Richard Moran appears to have settled the dispute in favour of 
McNaughtan.  See Richard Moran, Knowing Right from Wrong: The Insanity 
Defence of Daniel McNaughtan (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier 
Macmillan Publishers, 1981), pp. xi-xiii. 
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trial.  These theorists espoused a version of phrenology that was proposed solutions 
to metaphysical problems.  It was a philosophical system that allowed medico-legal 
theorists – doctors and lawyers alike – to propose distinctive answers to problems 
such as free will and partial insanity.  It was distinct from the practical aspect of the 
discipline, which emphasised the insights that could be gleaned from the examination 
of an individual’s skull.  This distinction between the practical and philosophical 
forms of phrenology is a thread that runs through the recent historiography of 
phrenology.  John D. Davies, Roger Cooter and David de Giustino all emphasise the 
fact that phrenology was a varied and multifaceted science.2  As the practical form of 
phrenology grew in popularity, the followers of the metaphysical aspect of 
phrenology began to hide the phrenological basis of their ideas.  This concealment 
allowed phrenological concepts to exert a subtle influence on medical jurisprudence, 
without being explicitly cited as the inspiration for theories of partial insanity and the 
treatment of mania. 
 
Phrenology began with the work of Franz Joseph Gall and his belief that discrete 
cranial faculties determined human character.  Gall’s major work, Anatomie et 
physiologie du systéme nerveux en general, et du cerveau en particulier, was 
published in 1810 and expanded over the next decade.3  His followers believed in the 
existence of discrete organs in the brain, each linked to a specific aspect of human 
character.  The terms organ and faculty were used fairly interchangeably, although 
                                                 
2 John D. Davies, Phrenology: Fad and Science: A 19th-Century American Crusade 
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1971); David de Giustino, Conquest of Mind: 
Phrenology and Victorian Social Thought (London: Croom Helm, 1975); Roger 
Cooter, The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organization 
of Consent in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984). 
3 Davies, Phrenology, pp. 6-7. 
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faculty was generally used to refer to the character trait associated with an organ.  
Phrenologists believed that the size of the organ was directly related to its influence 
over the individual’s character.  The faculties included traits such as Destructiveness 
and Acquisitiveness, and were not necessarily linked to a specific action, but 
functioned differently in different theoretical situations.  A person with a large organ 
for Benevolence, for example, was more likely to be kind to those around him- or 
herself.  As the skull had grown over these organs, the shape of the skull was thought 
to indicate the size of the organs underneath.  This principle meant that a 
phrenologist could analyse an individual’s character by examining the contours of 
their skull or their bulging eyes.  However, phrenologists did not follow a single 
codified doctrine.  There was widespread disagreement between phrenologists 
regarding the number of discrete organs and their positioning within the head.  This 
variation in opinion meant that different phrenologists could offer different 
interpretations of an individual’s character.  However, they all agreed that human 
character was a result of the size of these organs, even if they could not agree on 
their positions. 
 
It is important to realise that phrenology was just one element of the canon of 
medical knowledge in the early nineteenth century.  There was a range of 
explanations of insanity open to medical practitioners.  Phrenology played a part in a 
number of medico-legal treatises, but phrenology was rarely the sole influence on 
these works.  Theorists could draw on French schools, typified by Philippe Pinel, 
Jean-Etienne-Dominique Esquirol and Etienne-Jean Georget.  They could also draw 
on a model that spoke of discrete faculties of the mind, but did not link these to 
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physical divisions in the brain, which was espoused by some Scottish thinkers.4  Joel 
Peter Eigen has done a commendable job of contrasting the different schools that 
existed at the time.5  Theorists took a flexible approach to these disciplines.  For 
example, two of the theorists at the centre of this thesis, Isaac Ray and Forbes 
Winslow, subscribed to phrenological ideas.  However, their works also cited Pinel 
and his colleagues.  They participated in an intellectual world where concepts and 
examples could be borrowed from rival works and reinterpreted to make new 
arguments. 
 
Some historians have already examined phrenology’s role in the insanity defence.  In 
1954, Henry Weihofen mentioned that the doctrine shaped the way the participants 
in the McNaughtan trial understood the human mind.  Specifically, he believed that 
they accepted a model of the mind that included discrete faculties and organs.  
However, he did not explain phrenology’s attraction to the doctors and lawyers who 
were involved in the trial.6  John Starrett Hughes has written a biography of the key 
medical authority for the defence, Isaac Ray, emphasising that he was a firm believer 
in phrenology.  Hughes noted the influence that Ray had over the defence argument,7 
but did not explain the role of phrenology in the trial.  More recent works on the 
interaction between phrenology and law have tended to portray phrenology in a 
                                                 
4 G.N. Cantor, ‘Phrenology in Nineteenth-Century Edinburgh: an Historiographical 
Discussion’, Annals of Science, 32 (1975), pp. 206-207. 
5 See, for example, Joel Peter Eigen, Witnessing Insanity: Madness and Mad-Doctors 
in the English Court (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 58-81; Joel 
Peter Eigen, ‘”I answer as a physician”: opinion as fact in pre-McNaughtan insanity 
trials’, in Michael Clark and Catherine Crawford, eds., Legal Medicine in History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 168. 
6 Henry Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defence (Buffalo, New York: 
Dennis & Co, 1954), pp. 110-111. 
7 John Starrett Hughes, In the Law’s Darkness: Insanity and the Medico-Legal 
Career of Isaac Ray, 1807-1881 (PhD dissertation, Rice University, 1982), pp. 116-
117. 
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uniform and reductionist manner.  Joel Peter Eigen’s work on the insanity defence, 
for example, focuses on the obvious language and ideas of phrenology, rather than 
examining the underlying assumptions of the doctrine.8  This work aims to introduce 
a more nuanced understanding of phrenology to the historiographical record.  In 
doing so, the argument relies on a number of comprehensive studies of phrenology 
that explored its intellectual and cultural significance, but did not approach its role in 
the criminal justice system.9  These studies recognise the multifaceted nature of 
phrenology and its appeal to a variety of different groups.  Finally, this study 
recognises that phrenologists did not all agree on the faculties of the brain or their 
locations.  More importantly, they did not agree on the effect of these faculties.  
Some emphasised the role of the will in keeping these organs in check, while others 
accepted the determinist implications of the theory.  Some left out the implications of 
phrenology for criminal responsibility, while others brought these to the foreground 
and defended a regime of incarceration and treatment.  Reintroducing these subtleties 
allows for a more realistic assessment of the influence of phrenology, and its 
compatibility with contemporary ideas.  Just as phrenology was one part of a wider 
body of medical knowledge, the science itself was amorphous and flexible.  
Practitioners could pick and choose the elements they wished to emphasise, allowing 
phrenology to interact with existing legal and medical doctrine. 
 
The division of the organs into classes further complicated the phrenological picture 
of human character.  George Combe, a famous British phrenologist, spoke of animal 
                                                 
8 Joel Peter Eigen, ‘Delusion in the Courtroom: The Role of Partial Insanity in Early 
Forensic Testimony’, Medical History, 35 (1991), pp. 44-45; Eigen, Witnessing 
Insanity, pp. 68-72. 
9 For example, Davies, Phrenology; de Giustino, Conquest of Mind; Cooter, Cultural 
Meaning of Popular Science. 
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propensities, moral sentiments and intellectual faculties.10  If these classes were not 
in balance, then the animal propensities might be too powerful for the intellectual 
faculties to control, which could give an individual a passionate and impulsive 
character.11  This characterisation of the cerebral faculties explained why the most 
violent criminals acted like wild animals, while the most civilised members of 
society were paragons of science and reason.  However, some phrenologists offered a 
more sophisticated model of causality and responsibility than this short description 
implies.  These practitioners believed that an individual with an unsatisfactory 
phrenological profile could improve their behaviour by exercising the diminutive 
organs.  This added a level of complexity to the model of criminal responsibility and 
institutionalisation proposed by phrenologists and their followers.  Despite this 
complexity, it is reasonable to argue that phrenologists generally favoured 
exculpatory determinism over culpability and rehabilitation over punishment. 
 
Phrenology’s influence in the McNaughtan trial is a potent reminder of the power of 
scientific ideas to shape related discourses, including legal discourse.  The defence 
arguments made in the McNaughtan trial were shaped by this now-discredited 
science.  Although the Rules have emerged as the most significant element of the 
case, and overshadowed the trial itself, the arguments made in the trial provide a 
window to the way in which lawyers were beginning to understand insanity in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  More importantly, the Rules were also shaped by the 
argument in the trial and the medical theories cited by the defence.  These Rules are 
                                                 
10 George Combe, Moral Philosophy or the Duties of Man Considered in his 
Individual, Social, and Domestic Capacities (Edinburgh: MacLachlan, Stewart and 
Co.; London: Longman and Co., and Simpkin, Marshall and Co.; Boston, US: 
Marsh, Capen, Lyon and Webb, 1840), pp. 11-19. 
11 Combe, Moral Philosophy, p. 25. 
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still seen as the moment of codification of the insanity defence.  As late as 1961, the 
House of Lords relied on the McNaughtan Rules as the correct test of insanity.12  A 
prominent legal text, describing the legal status of the Rules in New South Wales, 
notes that 
 
Notwithstanding the extensive statutory provisions governing the operation 
and consequences of the defence of mental illness, it is not defined in the 
legislation and the elements are derived from the common law M’Naghten 
rules.13 
 
While the reinterpretation of McNaughtan to include phrenology does not unseat the 
entire theory of the insanity defence, it should give many lawyers pause to consider 
the origin of current legal ideas. 
 
The first chapter of this thesis argues that the physical basis of phrenology allowed 
the defence to privilege the evidence of their medical witnesses.  The diagnosis of 
insanity in criminal proceedings had long been the role of lay witnesses.  In 
McNaughtan, the defence was forced to argue that their medical witnesses were 
qualified to diagnose insanity, while the prosecution’s lay witnesses were not.  These 
                                                 
12 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, [1961] 3 All ER 
523, [1961] UKHL 3 (House of Lords, 3 October 1961), British and Irish Legal 
Information Institute, <http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1961/3.html>, viewed 
24 September 2008. 
13 David Brown, David Farrier, Sandra Egger, Luke McNamara and Alex Steel, 
Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot’s Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on 
Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales (Sydney, The Federation Press, 
2006), p. 534.  The spelling of McNaughtan used by Brown, Farrier, Egger, 
McNamara and Steel is one of many variants in common usage.  Incidentally, Brown 
et al go on to suggest that Isaac Ray “criticised earlier theories of phrenology” (p. 
535) in his Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity.  As will be shown, Ray actually relied 
heavily on phrenological ideas. 
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medical witnesses – at least one of whom was a phrenologist – were already firm 
believers in the need to broaden the insanity defence.  The defence framed this 
argument for the privileging of medical expertise by referring to phrenological 
explanations of insanity and the physical cause of mental illness. 
 
The second chapter of this thesis argues that the portrayal of partial insanity in the 
defence argument in McNaughtan owes a great deal to phrenology.  Partial insanity 
was typified by insanity in relation to only a few topics, or phases of sanity and 
insanity.  While the idea of partial insanity was nothing new, phrenological concepts 
allowed the defence lawyers to argue that an insane defendant could appear sane 
while committing outrageous crimes.  The division of the brain into discrete 
phrenological faculties made it much easier to believe that some sections of the brain 
could be diseased while others were healthy.  In turn, this division explained why a 
defendant would be insane in relation to some topics, which were associated with the 
diseased regions of the brain, and sane in relation to others.  In McNaughtan, 
phrenology allowed the defence to convince the court that partial maniacs should be 
excused, and provides an example of the power of the science to shape legal 
doctrine. 
 
The third chapter of this thesis explores the path phrenology took from the work of 
the founders of the science, through the theories of medical jurisprudence that relied 
on the belief in discrete organs of the brain, and into legal argument in the 
McNaughtan trial.  The division of phrenology into practical and philosophical 
schools is vital to this process.  While the practical form of the doctrine was 
discredited, the philosophical form took root in the works of a number of medico-
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legal theorists.  From there, it was able to play a role in legal argument.  However, 
this progression was only possible once phrenology was camouflaged, because of the 
continuing controversy surrounding its status and the connotations of the practical 
form of the science.  This concealment is part of the reason why phrenology’s role in 
the law has been left out of the historical record: an analysis of the influence of the 
doctrine requires a sensitivity to the negotiated nature of legal and medical 
knowledge.  The law’s incorporation of phrenology was part of medical experts’ 
increasing role in insanity cases.  It was a process that was much more likely to take 
place in famous cases and higher courts, where the medical experts involved had the 
status to be taken seriously by the court.  This is not to say that practical, head-
reading phrenologists were barred from the courtroom, but as will be shown, this 
form of the science was much less likely to be accepted by legal authorities.  The key 
to phrenology’s role in the law was its subtle, hidden influence in key works of 
medical jurisprudence. 
 
This thesis brings together the historiographical consensus on the nature and 
meaning of phrenology and the vast body of scholarship dealing with the 
development of the insanity defence in the early nineteenth century.  It applies 
existing understandings of phrenology to the role of the science in shaping legal 
doctrine.  In doing so, it engages with scholarship on the development of the insanity 
defence and the role of medical expertise in insanity trials.  Some of these works 
have briefly explored the role of phrenology in the law, but have not done so in great 
detail.  Nor has any comprehensive study of the doctrines and arguments involved in 
the case linked phrenology and the McNaughtan defence in a detailed way.  Recent 
scholarship on the insanity defence has emphasised the patterns emerging from 
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minor trials, in contrast to the classical study of the insanity defence that focussed on 
the evolution of principle in a number of major cases.14  There is one important 
distinction between this work and the more recent studies of the insanity defence: 
because of the significance of the McNaughtan Rules to the subsequent development 
of the insanity defence, and because of the wealth of sources relating to the trial, this 
thesis focuses on McNaughtan alone.   It argues that the reinterpretation of the case 
to include phrenology allows for a more accurate understanding of the legal doctrines 
involved in the trial.  It also clarifies the nature of phrenology and its relationship to 
legal knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 For examples of recent scholarship focussing on a range of minor cases, see Eigen, 
Witnessing Insanity.  For an example of classical scholarship focussing on the major 
cases in the insanity defence, see Nigel Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, vol. 
1, The Historical Perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968). 
 14
Chapter 1: Phrenology and the privileging of medical knowledge 
 
The trial of Daniel McNaughtan is an unlikely place to begin a reassessment of the 
insanity defence.  Countless lawyers and historians have studied the transcript of his 
trial and the famous Rules.  These Rules are still cited as the moment when the 
insanity defence was codified, and therefore have an enormous significance for 
English legal thinkers.  The case is discussed frequently in articles and books on the 
insanity defence, and at least one book deals exclusively with the case.15  However, 
the status of the case also makes it the perfect place to start such a reassessment.  
Because it is so central, challenging the interpretation of McNaughtan challenges the 
history of the insanity defence.  Phrenology has been left out of most accounts of the 
defence, but its presence in McNaughtan suggests that the science was more 
significant than generally acknowledged. 
 
On 20 January 1843, McNaughtan shot and killed Edward Drummond.  Drummond 
was the private secretary of the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, who was 
McNaughtan’s intended victim.  At trial, the talented Alexander Cockburn QC led 
the defence.  A number of lay and medical witnesses testified to McNaughtan’s 
insanity, although he had managed to lead a relatively successful life and was 
certainly not a raving lunatic.  Eventually, the judges stopped the trial and allowed 
the jury to find McNaughtan not guilty on the basis of insanity.  The House of Lords 
then called on the judges to answer a number of questions about the insanity defence, 
and their answers formed the famous McNaughtan Rules.  The Rules codified the 
                                                 
15 Moran, Knowing Right from Wrong. 
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law relating to partial insanity and directions to the jury, and help to define insanity 
in the English legal system. 
 
Cockburn’s argument for the defence relied on phrenological ideas.  He had the 
difficult task of proving that McNaughtan was insane, although the defendant had 
made a significant amount of money in business and had managed to learn some 
anatomy.16  Phrenology allowed Cockburn to overcome these signs of sanity and 
argue that medical diagnoses should be privileged over lay opinions.  The lay 
witnesses had known McNaughtan or witnessed the crime, and some believed that he 
was sane.  Cockburn’s argument was a victory for the medical profession in their 
attempts to exert control over the diagnosis and treatment of insanity.  It was also 
ironic: phrenology was enormously popular among people with no medical training, 
and many laypersons attended lectures on the subject.  Nevertheless, phrenology 
played a vital role in convincing the court that they should accept the medical 
witnesses’ opinion that McNaughtan was insane. 
 
Phrenology allowed physicians and surgeons to assert their right to diagnose 
insanity.  Hand in hand with this right to diagnose went the right to determine the 
limits of criminal responsibility.  Believing that insanity was a physical disease, legal 
authorities increasingly accepted that medical experts should control the courtroom 
adjudication of insanity.  This change in opinion meant that surgeons and physicians 
were called as expert medical witnesses and expected to testify as to the defendant’s 
state of mind.  In his defence of McNaughtan, Alexander Cockburn argued that the 
                                                 
16 R v McNaughton (1843) 4 St. Tr. 847, reproduced in Donald J. West & Alexander 
Walk, eds., Daniel McNaughton: His Trial and the Aftermath (Ashford, Kent: 
Gaskell Books, 1977), pp. 18-20; 29. 
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medical experts’ testimony on the subject of the defendant’s state of mind should 
carry a great deal of weight, because “madness is a disease of the body operating on 
the mind, a disease of the cerebral organisation.”17  ‘Cerebral organisation’ was a 
term used by phrenologists and their followers to describe brain’s system of discrete 
organs.18  Cockburn may not have been aware of the significance of the term to 
phrenologists, but he was certainly aware of its implications.  He used phrenological 
ideas as a tool to privilege the testimony of medical experts over that of the lay 
witnesses. 
 
By explaining insanity in physical terms, nineteenth-century surgeons and physicians 
were making a claim of professional knowledge.  Andrew Scull has explained that 
these experts found themselves under threat from asylum managers without medical 
knowledge.19  Scull argues that there was increasing distrust of medical experts’ 
special ability to treat madness, especially in the context of increasing faith in the 
‘moral treatment’ for insanity.  Moral treatment prescribed warm baths and a lack of 
physical restraint as the best treatment for mental illness.  Because there was nothing 
in this treatment that required the supervision of a doctor, asylums began to fall 
under the control of well-meaning lay managers.  This movement was at its height in 
1815-1819, when a Select Committee in the House of Lords revealed the horrendous 
conditions inside asylums, and led to a number of bills to place asylums under the 
                                                 
17 R v McNaughton (1843), p. 34. 
18 Eliza W. Farnham, Rationale of Crime: Marmaduke B. Sampson’s ‘Treatise on 
Criminal Jurisprudence Considered in Relation to Cerebral Organization’ (1846; 
repr., Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1973), p. 2; Combe, Moral 
Philosophy, pp. 271-272. 
19 Andrew T. Scull, ‘From Madness to Mental Illness: Medical men as moral 
entrepreneurs’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 16, no. 2, (1975), pp. 218-261. 
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supervision of lay inspectors.20  Surgeons and physicians struck back with a physical 
explanation of madness.  If the disorder had a physical cause, its treatment should 
fall to the medical experts who treated all other physical illnesses.  As the nineteenth 
century went on, physical explanations for insanity became an important part of 
medical asylum managers’ claims of professional knowledge.21  Phrenology, as an 
explicitly physicalist theory, became very attractive. 
 
Cockburn’s main medical authority, Isaac Ray, supported the phrenological model of 
insanity.  Although he did not appear in the trial, his Medical Jurisprudence of 
Insanity22 formed the basis for most of Cockburn’s arguments about the nature of 
insanity.  Ray was medically trained, and became the superintendent of Maine Insane 
Hospital in 1841.  He followed phrenological principles throughout his career, 
although he tried to hide their influence in his later work.23  He argued that the 
physical condition of the brain had an enormous influence on human behaviour: 
 
It must not be forgotten, that the author of our being has also endowed us 
with certain moral faculties, comprising the various sentiments, propensities 
                                                 
20 Scull, ‘Madness to Mental Illness’, pp. 228-238. 
21 Andrew T. Scull, ‘Mad-doctors and Magistrates: English psychiatry’s struggle for 
professional autonomy in the nineteenth century’, Archives Européennes de 
Sociologie, 17, no. 2 (1976), pp. 279-305. 
22 Isaac Ray, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (Boston: Charles 
C. Little and James Brown, 1838), created 1 September 2004, Making of Modern 
Law, Gale, 
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/servlet/MOML?af=RN
&ae=F105365208&srchtp=a&ste=14>, viewed April-September 2008. 
23 Hughes, Isaac Ray, pp. 64-65. 
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and affections, which, like the intellect, being connected with the brain, are 
necessarily affected by pathological changes in that organism.24 
 
This statement relied on phrenological ideas.  The distinction between moral and 
intellectual faculties, and the use of categories such as “sentiments, propensities and 
affections” were shared with the works of prominent phrenologists.  For example, 
George Combe, a lawyer and leading figure in the science, divided the faculties in 
animal propensities, moral sentiments and intellectual faculties.25  J.G. Spurzheim, 
Gall’s student and heir to his authority, also spoke of propensities, sentiments and 
intellectual faculties.26  However, some anti-phrenologists also made a distinction 
between moral and intellectual aspects of the mind.  For example, James Cowles 
Prichard, who lectured against phrenology,27 differentiated between the moral and 
intellectual, and linked them in a vague way to the physical features of the brain.28  
Although he has been described as an anti-phrenologist, he cited prominent 
phrenologists in his work, sometimes with approval, sometimes without.  His 
references included Gall, George Combe’s phrenologist brother Andrew Combe, and 
Isaac Ray.29  This common ground between phrenologists and anti-phrenologists 
                                                 
24 Ray, Medical Jurisprudence, 
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/servlet/MOML?af=RN
&ae=F105365208&srchtp=a&ste=14>, p. 48. 
25 Combe, Moral Philosophy, p. 11. 
26 J.G. Spurzheim, The Physiological System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, Founded 
on an Anatomical and Physiological Examination of the Nervous System in General, 
and of the Brain in Particular; and Indicating the Dispositions and Manifestations of 
the Mind (London: Baldwin, Cradock & Joy, 1815), p. 276. 
27 Cooter, Cultural Meaning of Popular Science, p. 293. 
28 Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, law, and policy in 
England, 1830-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 166-167; 
Roger Smith, Trial By Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), pp. 42-43. 
29 James Cowles Prichard, On the Different Forms of Insanity in Relation to 
Jurisprudence: Designed for the Use of Persons Concerned in Legal Questions 
 19
reflects the flexibility of scientific understandings of the mind in the nineteenth 
century.  Some phrenologists, including Ray, successfully modified their ideas to 
make them more palatable to a potentially critical legal and medical audience, which 
contributed to these commonalities.  In Ray’s Medical Jurisprudence, this self-
regulation was manifested in a complete lack of explicit references to phrenology.  
Nevertheless, the model of the mind deployed in the book was fundamentally 
phrenological.  He added to the science by expressing its ideas in a theory of medical 
jurisprudence. 
 
Although he did not refer to phrenology itself, Ray drew on the work of prominent 
phrenologists.  He accepted their studies as well as their theories, and cited Gall, 
Spurzheim and Combe a number of times in his Treatise.30  For example, he noted 
that 
 
The dissections of many eminent observers, among whom it is enough to 
mention the names of Greding, Gall and Spurzheim, Calmet, Foville, 
Fabret, Bayle, Esquirol, and Georget, have placed it beyond doubt; and no 
pathological effect is better established – although its correctness was for a 
                                                                                                                                          
Regarding Unsoundness of Mind (London: Hippolyte Bailliere, 1842), created 1 
September 2004, Making of Modern Law, Gale, 
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy2.library.usyd.edu.au/servlet/MOML?af=RN
&ae=F104354714&srchtp=a&ste=14>, viewed 30 September 2008, pp. 142-143, 
179-180, 190-191, 200-202. 
30 Ray, Medical Jurisprudence, 
<http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/servlet/MOML?af=RN
&ae=F105365208&srchtp=a&ste=14>, pp. 68-69; 72-73; 188-189; 198-199. 
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long while doubted – than that deviations from the healthy structure are 
generally presented in the brains of insane subjects.31  
 
The fact that Ray could refer to the French physicians Esquirot and Georget 
alongside phrenologists such as Gall and Spurzheim is a testament to the 
compatibility and flexibility of explanations for insanity in the nineteenth century.  
Furthermore, the phrenological style of brain dissection was controversial among 
medical experts.32  Gall and Spurzheim believed that the brain should be scraped 
open, while anti-phrenologists believed it should be cut open.  The fact that Ray 
supported Gall and Spurzheim’s technique indicates his support for phrenology and 
its techniques.  On later pages, he hinted at the benefits that would flow from 
universal agreement on the phrenological organs and their placement. 
 
If men had agreed to receive some particular analysis and arrangement of 
the affective and intellectual faculties, and to assign a particular portion of 
the brain as its material organ, we might then discuss the question how far 
disease of one cerebral organ affects the actions of the rest, with the 
prospect of arriving at something like definite results.  But as no such 
unanimity exists, we can only consider the observations that have been 
made on the derangement of particular faculties, and thus form our opinions 
relative to their influence, by the general tenor of experience.33 
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Ray expressed regret that phrenology had not achieved greater acceptance and 
support, as it would greatly assist in the diagnosis of insanity.  But instead, 
experiment and observation would have to suffice.  For Ray, these observations 
would be grounded in phrenology.  He believed in the existence of discrete organs of 
the brain, even if not all his colleagues agreed.  He relied on a phrenological model 
of the brain, as well as utilising the observations of famous phrenologists.  The fact 
that his work was Cockburn’s main medical authority indicates that phrenology was 
far from the fringes of science. 
 
When medical experts referred to phrenology, they used it as a philosophy of 
responsibility, rather than a diagnostic tool.  One might have imagined that 
physicians trained in phrenology would use their science as a test of sanity or 
insanity, and in some cases, guilt and innocence.  Gall and Spurzheim certainly 
measured criminals’ heads, but they did not apply their techniques to questions of 
guilt and innocence or sanity and insanity.  They were more interested in validating 
their science.  They visited Spandau prison in 1805, to examine the prisoners, 
remarking on their enlarged organs of theft and murder.34  George Combe claimed 
that he could predict the crimes that convicted criminals had committed after 
measuring their skulls.35  Although their techniques could help the courts to sort the 
guilty from the innocent, these phrenologists preferred to apply their insights to 
philosophical arguments.  If crime was the result of physical disease, then it seemed 
manifestly unjust for the courts to punish and execute criminals.  George Combe 
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35 Combe, Moral Philosophy, p. 262-263. 
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argued that criminals were unable to prevent themselves from committing a crime 
because their phrenological profile determined their actions.  They should therefore 
be treated with the sympathy extended to any person with a physical impairment.36  
Phrenologists incorporated this determinist model of responsibility into theories of 
insanity, without actually asserting their right to judge guilt and innocence.  Instead 
of functioning as a diagnostic tool, phrenology inspired theories of responsibility.  
For these prominent phrenologists, their science was an opportunity to bring about a 
compassionate revolution in the criminal law, instead of a way to replace the jury 
trial with scientific inquiry. 
 
As phrenology made its way into works of medical jurisprudence, it brought with it a 
theory that denied individual responsibility for crime.  To phrenology-trained 
surgeons and physicians, phrenology implied that human action was determined.  It 
complicated human responsibility by dismissing self-control and suggesting that the 
physical workings of the brain dictated action.  Because the individual had no control 
over their own phrenological profile, these medical experts felt that it was unjust to 
inflict punishment on the criminally insane.  Ray described the phrenological 
explanation of insanity, where the moral faculties are affected by “pathological 
changes in the cerebral organism.”37  He argued that 
 
in this, the most deplorable condition…the wretched patient finds himself 
urged, perhaps, to the commission of every outrage, and though perfectly 
                                                 
36 Combe, Moral Philosophy, p. 263-264. 
37 Ray, Medical Jurisprudence, 
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conscious of what he is doing, unable to offer the slightest resistance to the 
overwhelming power that impels him.38 
 
This physical explanation of insanity allowed Ray to argue that the mentally ill were 
missing the essential elements of responsibility.  Ray’s work is an example of a 
philosophy of human responsibility that was informed by phrenology.  Forbes 
Winslow, one of the defence witnesses, later wrote an analysis of ‘Recent Trials in 
Lunacy.’39  In one of these cases, there was a suggestion that the defendant had 
caused her own insanity by repeatedly giving in to temptation and vice.  
Nevertheless, Winslow refused to differentiate between inherent insanity and 
insanity caused by vice, and argued that all maniacs should be equal before the law.40  
His argument is another example of phrenologists’ acceptance of the determined 
nature the actions of the insane. 
 
In the early nineteenth century, courts were still grappling with the relationship 
between lay and medical evidence of insanity.  Lay witnesses still played an 
important part in trials where the defendant claimed that they were mad when they 
committed the crime.  Insanity had long been understood as manifest in the 
behaviour of the patient, and this tradition was reflected in the lay testimony of the 
defendant’s friends and associates.41  In the trial of John Chaplin for the murder of 
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his wife in 1812, a number of neighbours and lay witnesses were called to testify to 
his past behaviour.  Although one witnesses declined to comment on Chaplin’s 
mental state, preferring to leave that question to a doctor, the prosecution continued 
to ask the lay witnesses if the defendant had exhibited any signs of insanity.42  Even 
in McNaughtan, in which the wrongful act was agreed and both sides were well 
aware that insanity would be the main issue, a large number of lay witnesses were 
called. The prosecution witnesses testified to McNaughtan’s repeated appearances at 
the scene prior to the murder, his normal and reserved habits, and his interest in 
science and anatomy.43  These witnesses were continuing a long tradition of judging 
a defendant by comparing his or her actions to the accepted standards of sane 
behaviour.  The defence also relied on lay witnesses.  They spoke of their past 
dealings with McNaughtan, the odd things that he had done, and his obsession with 
persecution.44  Neither side constructed their case without employing well-worn 
concepts of sane and insane behaviour.  Although medical witnesses were beginning 
to supplant the idea that anybody could identify madness in a defendant’s behaviour, 
most courtroom participants still expected that madness could be confirmed or 
dismissed by the defendant’s acquaintances. 
 
Medical witnesses in the nineteenth century had a complex relationship with lay 
understandings of insanity.  Early medical witnesses offered testimony that was 
indistinguishable from the evidence of lay witnesses.  Joel Peter Eigen and Gregory 
                                                                                                                                          
expression of lay understandings of insanity in criminal procedure, see Arlie 
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43 R v McNaughton (1843), pp. 26-29. 
44 R v McNaughton (1843), pp. 57-66. 
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Andoll have observed that prior to 1825, the evidence of most medical experts 
centred on the defendant’s behaviour, instead of providing evidence that was 
recognisably medical. 45  Often, they were testifying as a friend or neighbour of the 
patient, rather than as a surgeon or physician.  Elsewhere, Eigen has suggested that 
doctors avoided technical physicalist terms because there was no consensus in favour 
of a single physical explanation of insanity.46  Medical experts’ claims of 
professional expertise were based on physical explanations of disease, but these were 
still controversial claims.  Eigen suggests that medical witnesses avoided their 
explicit use because they knew that they were likely to be challenged in the 
courtroom.  When discussing insanity, which had a tradition of lay explanation, 
medical witnesses were wary of asserting their own specialised knowledge.  Eigen 
argues that instead, they served a legitimating function for the conclusions of the lay 
witnesses who also testified.  This phenomenon demonstrates the complexity of the 
relationship between lay and medical evidence in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. 
 
By the 1840s, however, the pattern that Eigen observed had broken down.  In 
Edward Oxford’s famous 1840 trial for shooting at the Queen, the medical witnesses 
were asked to form their opinions on the strength of the defendant’s strange 
behaviour as well as his physical features.  One witness, Dr Hodgkin, testified that he 
thought the manner of the crime was enough to form a strong inference in favour of 
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insanity, but also noted that the disease was often accompanied by physical 
abnormalities of the brain.47  Nevertheless, he was forced to defend his special right 
to diagnose insanity after being asked why a medical expert’s conclusion would be 
more reliable than any other person’s.  He defended his diagnosis by referring to his 
experience with the mentally ill, but denied that it was his role to define the limit of 
responsibility.48  His argument suggests that medical experts were not always 
accepted in criminal trials, and were still wary of overstepping the boundaries of 
their expertise.  John Conolly, the resident doctor at Hanwell Lunatic Asylum, was 
received more favourably in the Oxford trial.  He diagnosed the defendant’s insanity 
on the basis of both his behaviour and his physical features.  Conolly had measured 
the defendant’s head and found a shape associated with insanity, but also took notes 
on Oxford’s inability to comprehend the seriousness of his crime.49  A medical 
witness was expected to offer insights beyond those open to a lay witness.  This was 
the experience of Dr Birt Davis, physician, magistrate and coroner,50 who was 
willing to conclude that Oxford was insane on the basis of the circumstances of the 
crime alone.51  The bench could hardly believe that he would offer such an opinion, 
and the prosecutor asked the witness whether he was testifying as an expert or as a 
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layperson.  This veiled insult suggests that the legal participants were expecting to 
hear a doctor offer a distinctively medical opinion.  Arlie Loughnan has argued that 
legal definitions of madness are constructed in a manner that can be understood by a 
lay observer, in a process that preserves ideas of “manifest madness.”52  As medical 
witnesses became involved in the courtroom diagnosis of insanity in the early 
nineteenth century, they were forced to explain why their opinions should prevail in 
the face of these lay understandings of insanity.  Some justified their diagnosis by 
referring to signs of insanity in the defendant’s physical features.  Others identified 
insanity in the defendant’s behaviour, but linked this conclusion with a medical 
explanation of insanity.  Medical witnesses were faced with the difficult task of 
satisfying both manifest madness and an expectation that a doctor could offer 
something more than a lay witness. 
 
McNaughtan’s defence team did not rely on lay witnesses alone.  Because Cockburn 
was portraying insanity as a physical illness, it was in his interest to introduce 
medical evidence of McNaughtan’s insanity.  The involvement of medical witnesses 
was far from unusual in 1843, as medical experts had been playing ever-expanding 
roles in legal proceedings for years.53  Cockburn explained his reliance on medical 
expertise by referring to the physical basis of insanity: 
 
It is now, I believe, a matter placed beyond doubt that madness is a disease 
of the body operating upon the mind, a disease of the cerebral organisation; 
and that a precise and accurate knowledge of this disease can only be 
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acquired by those who have made it the subject of attention and experience, 
of long reflection, and of diligent investigation.54 
 
Cockburn relied on this explanation of insanity because it privileged the testimony of 
his medical experts.  In a case where there was extensive evidence for the 
defendant’s sanity, the medical evidence to the contrary was vital.  Describing 
insanity as a physical illness allowed Cockburn to use the medical evidence to trump 
the opinions of the lay witnesses.  As Ward has observed, Cockburn emphasised the 
right of the jury to come to a verdict based on the advice of the medical experts, 
although the fact that Chief Justice Tindal practically demanded a finding of insanity 
suggests that the jury actually had very little say.55  Cockburn’s portrayal of insanity 
as a physical disease allowed him to privilege the medical evidence.  These medical 
witnesses played an important role in affirming McNaughtan’s insanity. 
 
The medical witnesses in McNaughtan offered a powerful and united argument in 
favour of the defendant’s insanity.  These medical experts were permitted to offer 
their own assessments of the defendant’s responsibility.  As Moran states, where the 
defendant’s capacity is the issue, medical experts were expected to offer an opinion 
as to his or her mental state at the time of the act, and the jury would then decide 
whether this state satisfied the legal test of capacity.56  In reality, as Tony Ward has 
revealed, medical experts played a variety of different roles in insanity trials, from 
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mere observer of insanity to an authority who could sway the case.57  Two of the 
medical experts implicated in the McNaughtan trial, Isaac Ray and Forbes Winslow, 
believed that the jury should follow the opinion of the medical experts.58  Just like 
Ray, Winslow believed in phrenology,59 although it was never mentioned explicitly 
in his Plea of Insanity.  Although counsel in McNaughtan were arguing over the 
correct legal test of insanity, the medical experts for the defence were permitted to 
pre-empt the test and the jury’s right to apply it to the evidence.  They offered their 
own opinions of McNaughtan’s criminal responsibility.  Sir Alexander Morison, for 
example, testified that McNaughtan’s delusion “deprived the prisoner of all restraint 
over his actions.”60  The other doctors gave similar evidence.  Richard Moran has 
argued that the prosecution should have objected to this evidence, and their failure to 
do so handed the case to the defence.61  Instead of limiting the medical evidence, the 
court lost sight of the distinction between expert testimony and the questions of fact 
that belong to the jury. The judges accepted these medical arguments and 
emphasised the fact that all of the medical evidence was in favour of the defence.  In 
some insanity trials, the bench took a harsh attitude towards medical experts and 
their evidence.  Joel Peter Eigen has emphasised the role of judges in framing a 
medical expert’s testimony, which could include criticising and discrediting it.62  The 
bench could easily cast the defence argument into doubt.  In this context, Chief 
Justice Tindal’s support for the medical evidence is particularly significant.  
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Stopping the trial, he stated that “we feel the evidence, especially that of the last two 
medical gentlemen…to be very strong, and sufficient to induce my learned brothers 
and myself to stop the case.”63  Just like the medical experts who saw the assessment 
of responsibility as a part of their expertise, the court accepted that these doctors 
were qualified to assess criminal responsibility.  Because they understood insanity as 
a physical disease, they realised that medical experts were in the best position to 
diagnose insanity.  These medical witnesses, all convinced that McNaughtan was 
insane, won the trial for the defence. 
 
McNaughtan’s defence was forced to argue that the lay witnesses’ understandings of 
insanity were inferior to the ideas of the medical witnesses who appeared for the 
defence.  Cockburn’s foundation for this argument was phrenological.  He relied 
heavily on Isaac Ray’s work, as well as calling another believer in phrenology, 
Forbes Winslow, as a witness.  These medical opinions were enough to convince the 
court that insanity was a physical disease, and that its diagnosis should rest in the 
hands of the medical experts.  The trial was a single example of the increasing 
courtroom role for the medical expert in the early nineteenth century.  When these 
witnesses stepped into the courtroom, they found that they had to offer something 
more than the lay witnesses with whom they were compared.  In McNaughtan’s trial, 
they responded with testimony that effectively supplanted the jury’s role and offered 
a conclusion about the defendant’s state of mind and responsibility at the time of the 
crime.  The defence argument that insanity had a physical cause set the scene for the 
acceptance of the medical opinions that affirmed McNaughtan’s insanity. 
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Chapter 2: Phrenology and partial insanity 
 
In the McNaughtan trial, the court accepted the doctrine of partial insanity on the 
basis of a phrenological argument.  Phrenology, and phrenological ideas, enabled 
Cockburn to argue that McNaughtan fell within this ill-defined legal theory.  Partial 
insanity involved delusions in relation to specific ideas and subjects, or an inability 
to control violent urges.  The fundamental principles of phrenology lent themselves 
to the validation of this doctrine.  Phrenologists divided the brain into discrete 
organs, which suggested that the each organ could be individually diseased.  As each 
organ was associated with a different behaviour or desire, a diseased organ would 
manifest itself in insanity in relation to a specific topic.  On a more abstract level, 
which ignored the organs specified by phrenologists, it suggested that a maniac 
would not necessarily be completely insane, as only some parts of their brain were 
diseased.  Some legal authorities opposed the implications of this idea, and regarded 
partial insanity as a dangerous doctrine.  They suspected that all criminals were 
unbalanced in some way, which meant that lowering the standard of exculpatory 
insanity could excuse many criminals.  Under such a system, any person who 
committed a crime might successfully argue that they were insane.  Nevertheless, the 
phrenologists in the medical community had gained enough influence to ensure that 
partial insanity was a viable doctrine.  Their ideas were expressed in the defence 
argument in McNaughtan. 
 
Other historians have noted that phrenology played a role in the doctrine of partial 
insanity in McNaughtan.  Moran has written a comprehensive analysis of the 
McNaughtan case, emphasising the possibility that McNaughtan was actually sane, 
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but persecuted for his political beliefs.  He noted that the case has already been 
criticised for its reliance on phrenology.64  Moran was referring to Henry Weihofen’s 
1954 work on the development and (then) current status of the insanity defence.  
Weihofen briefly argued that the popularity of phrenology at the time of the decision 
explains why the judges were willing to recognise that the defendant could be insane 
on some topics and sane on others.65  This thesis picks up Weihofen’s argument and 
explores the influence of phrenology in greater depth.  By way of contrast, Joel Peter 
Eigen has approached the problem from a different direction.  He has argued that 
phrenologists’ division of the mind into discrete organs allowed them to explain 
partial insanity.66  Eigen’s work is an admirable exploration of the interaction 
between phrenology and discourses of responsibility.  However, Eigen does not 
mention the role of the doctrine in McNaughtan, preferring to discuss the influence 
of the doctrine in an intellectual sense rather than a concrete legal sense.  He also 
emphasised the writings of famous phrenologists such as Gall, Spurzheim and the 
Combe brothers, rather than following their ideas into the medico-legal community.  
This thesis applies Eigen’s fundamental arguments about the relationship between 
partial insanity and phrenology to a reassessment of McNaughtan.  The key to 
explaining the role of phrenology in the McNaughtan trial is to analyse its role in the 
work of the medical theorists who influenced the defence argument.  As these lines 
of influence have not been followed in depth, it is time to revisit phrenology’s 
redefinition of the doctrine of partial insanity. 
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Phrenologists held that the brain is divided into separate organs, each of which is 
associated with a human emotion or impulse.  Spurzheim published a list of cerebral 
faculties that included Philoprogenitiveness, which was the love of one’s offspring,67 
and Destructiveness, which was the urge to kill or destroy.68  These were both 
propensities, which meant that they were concerned with feelings rather than 
intellect.  The feelings were also influenced by the sentiments, which were further 
divided into sentiments that were present in both humans and animals and sentiments 
that were observed only in humans.69  In Spurzheim’s model, the intellect was 
controlled by a different set of organs.  These included faculties that gave the ability 
to perceive individuality and form (“knowing faculties”), and faculties that gave the 
ability to reflect, such as Comparison and Causality.70  Although phrenologists did 
not agree on the precise locations or names of the organs, they did agree that this was 
the basic structure of the brain.  George Combe wrote of animal propensities, moral 
sentiments, and intellectual faculties, following Spurzheim’s model.71  The animal 
propensities were the organs that inspire impulsive actions and needed to be 
controlled by the moral and intellectual faculties.  Moral sentiments controlled 
emotions and feelings, while the intellectual faculties allowed an individual to 
understand and perceive his or her surroundings.  Combe explained crime by 
suggesting that the animal propensities of criminals were more powerful than their 
moral and intellectual faculties.72  Because some organs controlled the violent and 
impulsive faculties, and others controlled the intellect and emotions, the two areas of 
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the brain could be independently disordered.  This separation implied that a person 
could be violent and impulsive, while their intellect remained intact. 
 
Phrenologists explained individual behaviour by referring to specific faculties, or 
combinations thereof.  Their model was also used to explain criminality.  For 
example, a weak organ of Philoprogenitiveness was associated with the crime of 
infanticide.  This organ controlled one’s love of their own children, and it made 
sense that a woman with a small organ of Philoprogenitiveness would be more likely 
to kill her children.  Spurzheim did not claim that a small Philoprogenitiveness drove 
a woman to infanticide, but instead suggested that that she would be unable “to resist 
those external circumstances which provoke her to commit this crime.”73  Similarly, 
Spurzheim drew a connection between the organ of Destructiveness and particularly 
violent and cruel murders.74  Generally speaking, there was an association between 
crime and the propensities, while the intellectual faculties were associated with 
lauded character traits.  A person with a large and powerful organ of Colouring, for 
example, would make a good artist.75  Combinations of faculties could also explain 
some behaviours and crimes.  George Combe illustrated this phenomenon with an 
example drawn from a major contemporary criminal trial.  John Bellingham had 
murdered the Prime Minister because he thought that he had been refused assistance 
while incarcerated overseas.  Combe argued that Bellingham’s desire for revenge had 
sprung from powerful propensities of Destructiveness and Self-esteem.  Because 
Bellingham’s higher faculties of Benevolence and Conscientiousness were small, 
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they were unable to keep the larger animal propensities under control.76  Thus 
phrenologists were able to use the division of the brain and mind into discrete organs 
to explain why specific crimes had been committed.  Even if their explanations now 
seem naïve, they offered an explanation of one of the most troublesome 
philosophical problems of the period.  The phrenologists explained odd behaviour, 
delusion and obsession – the classic signs of partial insanity – by simply dividing the 
mind into separate organs, and associating each organ with a specific impulse or 
pattern of behaviour. 
 
Phrenology had a more problematic relationship with periodical insanity.  While 
phrenology could easily explain insanity in relation to specific topics, it struggled to 
account for temporary insanity.  If madness resulted from a disorder of the physical 
structure of the brain, then changes in the patient’s condition would suggest that the 
brain was also changing during these periods of insanity.  Phrenologists found this 
difficult to accept.  Isaac Ray, attempting to reconcile periodic insanity and 
phrenology, argued 
 
that the intermissions of mania are ever so complete, that the mind is 
restored to its original integrity, would seem scarcely probable, from the 
fact, that the very seat of the pathological changes is the material organ on 
which the manifestations of the mental phenomena depend.77 
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Ray attempted to explain these periods of apparent sanity by denying that the patient 
had made a complete recovery.  Phrenologists could not believe that the brain could 
be healed so quickly only to descend into mania again. Although the patient may 
appear healthy, his “mind is weak” and a wise observer would suspect that he is still 
unwell.78  This rule made the attribution of criminal responsibility in these situations 
problematic.  Ray believed that a crime committed during a period of lucidity was 
likely to be the result of a sudden recurrence of disease.  He appealed to the concept 
of temporary “cerebral irritation” in arguing that the temporary cure had given way 
to insanity at the moment of the crime. 79  Accordingly, a maniac suffering from 
periodic insanity should not be responsible for their crimes as they were doubtless 
caused by a momentary attack of mania.  Ray’s solution to the problem of periodic 
partial insanity was to simply deny that the periods of lucidity were periods of full 
recovery.  Ray’s argument for the non-existence of temporary sanity is a good 
example of phrenology’s struggle to explain lucid periods and periodic insanity. 
 
Phrenologists could more readily explain partial insanity was it based on a delusion 
in relation to one or more topics, rather than when it was periodical.  Joel Peter Eigen 
has explored the link between the discrete organs of the brain and phrenological 
accounts of partial insanity.80  The essential compatibility of these ideas is 
exemplified in Ray’s Medical Jurisprudence.  The greater part of his discussion of 
the disease was dedicated to partial insanity manifested in delusion.  His ideas were 
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subsequently cited by the defence in McNaughtan, and created a junction between 
phrenological theories of mania and the McNaughtan trial.  As his work was the 
bridge between phrenology and the insanity defence, it is worth examining in detail.  
The most obvious feature of his argument regarding partial insanity was the 
distinction between partial mania of the intellectual faculties and partial mania of the 
moral faculties.  As noted above, the distinction between these two types of faculties 
was a common feature of both Spurzheim and Combe’s models of the brain.  Partial 
intellectual mania was characterised by delusion and misperception affecting the 
intellectual faculties.81  Sufferers appeared to be sane on all other topics, but would 
maintain a specific idea that was clearly insane.  Ray referred to patients who 
believed that their legs were made of glass or that they had the devil or a family of 
snakes living inside them.82  Intellectual mania was contrasted to moral mania, which 
took up a much larger portion of Ray’s work.  Moral mania was disease of the 
affective or moral faculties.  Ray emphasised that this disease was not an illness of 
the ability to understand or to reason, but was instead a disease that led to wild and 
uncontrollable fury.83  In another example of the potential for different schools of 
thought to interact, Ray acknowledged Pinel had first diagnosed moral insanity.84  
Ray argued that the increase of “vital forces” in any organ of the brain could lead to 
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overwhelming instinctive impulses.85  By way of comparison, Spurzheim and Combe 
argued that overactive cerebral faculties would create overwhelming desires to please 
those organs.86  Ray had transformed Spurzheim and Combe’s theories of human 
action into a theory of insanity, incorporating Pinel’s work along the way.  The 
phrenological influences on Ray’s work are clear.  Partial moral mania was a disease 
of just a few of the moral faculties.  He illustrates partial moral mania with a number 
of cases of uncontrollable kleptomania, and emphasises that the patients in question 
had distinctive cerebral organisation.87  In some of these cases, the Gall and 
Spurzheim had personally diagnosed the phrenological abnormality.  Ray’s work 
represents the junction between phrenological theories of mania and medico-legal 
arguments in favour of the recognition of partial insanity. 
 
Before partial insanity could be fully recognised by the courts, medico-legal experts 
advocating for the doctrine had to overcome the similarities between partial insanity 
and criminality.  In cases of total insanity there could be no confusion between a 
maniac and a criminal.  When the total maniac spoke in tongues or failed to 
comprehend an ordinary conversation, he or she was easy to distinguish from a 
scheming criminal with an ordinary motive.  However, partial insanity blurred this 
boundary.  Partial insanity was typified by sanity co-existing with insanity on 
specific topics.  A person suffering from partial insanity could appear to be perfectly 
normal until they committed a ferocious and violent crime.  Legal authorities were 
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understandably reluctant to recognise a doctrine that shrunk the gap between sanity 
and insanity.  Sir Matthew Hale, one of the most famous English legal authorities, 
declared in the seventeenth century that a person had to be wholly insane to benefit 
from the insanity defence.  Acknowledging that some people could be insane on 
certain topics or subjects, Hale argued that 
 
this partial insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing of any 
offence for its matter capital; for doubtless most persons that are felons of 
themselves, and others are under a degree of partial insanity, when they 
commit these offences: it is very difficult to define the indivisible line that 
divides perfect and partial insanity.88 
 
This passage demonstrates the feared link between partial insanity and criminality, 
and the refusal to recognise the doctrine because of the danger that it would 
exculpate a great number of criminals.  As early as the seventeenth century, 
authorities were aware that maniacs were not always obviously and clearly insane, 
but this did not convince them that partial insanity should be recognised. 
 
Isaac Ray, sensitive to this obstacle to the doctrine of partial insanity, challenged 
Hale’s argument in his own Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity.  Recognising that 
Hale’s rule was still persuasive, he believed that it was the duty of a modern medical 
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expert to dispel the old-fashioned ideas of the legal authorities.  Ray argued that the 
similarity between partial insanity and criminality actually suggested that criminals 
should be treated with greater compassion.  After all, if all criminality proceeded 
from partial insanity, then compassion for the insane should extend to criminals.89  
Nevertheless, Ray knew he was on slippery ground, and was careful to outline the 
differences between criminals and partial maniacs.  For example, he argued that there 
was a material difference between the actions of the passions in cases of insanity and 
criminality.  That is, 
 
Madness is the result of a certain pathological condition of the brain, while 
the criminal effects of violent passions merely indicate unusual strength of 
those passions, or a deficient education of those higher and nobler faculties, 
that furnish the necessary restraint upon their power.90 
 
Ray emphasised the distinction between mania and criminality by arguing that each 
involved a wholly different relationship between the will and the faculties.  
Criminals merely had strong animal propensities or weak intellectual faculties, 
whereas maniacs were diseased.  Forbes Winslow published a similar discussion of 
the differences between partial maniacs and criminals.  These differences included 
factors such as motive, premeditation, and attempts to escape from the scene, all of 
which would be observed in criminals but not in the homicidal maniac.  Finally, 
Winslow claimed that physical changes were often observed before a homicidal 
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maniac struck, and argued that when these changes were not found in confirmed 
cases of homicidal mania, it was simply because the examination of the maniac had 
been unsatisfactory.91  The similarity between criminality and partial insanity was a 
major obstacle for phrenologists, but it was one that both Ray and Winslow were 
keen to address.  The McNaughtan trial would be their opportunity to convince a 
court that partial insanity was a valid and exculpatory form of the disease. 
 
At the start of the nineteenth century the legal test of insanity was quite incompatible 
with the idea of partial insanity.  The threshold was often stated to be one of total 
insanity or deprivation of reason.  As noted above, Sir Matthew Hale emphasised 
that total madness was required before the insanity defence could be made out.  
Partial insanity was possible, but the defence would only be open to a defendant who 
lacked the understanding of a fourteen year old.92   This test was a cognitive one, 
which emphasised the defendant’s ability to understand and reason.  Another popular 
test of insanity was whether the defendant could distinguish between right and 
wrong.  This criterion first appeared in physicians’ works in the thirteenth century, 
was eventually recognised by lawyers in the seventeenth century, and was offered in 
a trial as the threshold of insanity in the eighteenth century.93  In Arnold’s 1723 trial 
for attempted murder, the judge made it clear that the defendant must be “totally 
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deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing.”94  
The knowledge of right and wrong was essentially another cognitive test, but with 
the added complexity that it was testing the patient’s cognition of moral norms 
instead of their reason.  However, both these tests of partial insanity were ignored in 
Earl Ferrers’s 1760 trial for murder, where the Solicitor-General, conducting the 
prosecution, emphasised that a legally insane defendant must be suffering from total 
insanity.  Even total temporary lack of reason would be sufficient, but partial insanity 
would not.  Furthermore, if the defendant could tell the difference between good and 
evil and understand the nature of his or her actions, then he or she could be held 
responsible.95  These opinions indicate that the legal test of insanity was quite narrow 
at the start of the nineteenth century.  Total insanity was the threshold, and partial 
insanity was expressed in relation to understanding, rather than self-control. 
 
This narrow doctrine was challenged in a series of cases of partial insanity in the 
early nineteenth century.  These cases broadened the law of insanity to recognise the 
emerging doctrine.  One of the most famous of these cases was Hadfield’s 1800 trial 
for shooting at the King.  Hadfield was an ex-soldier who had sustained a serious 
head wound in battle.  Believing that he should be executed for the good of 
humanity, he conspired to shoot at the King, for which he would surely be tried and 
hung.96  His defence counsel, Thomas Erskine, had the difficult task of proving that a 
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man who had planned his crime was insane.  One factor in his favour was Hadfield’s 
brain injury, and Erskine managed to find medical experts willing to testify that 
Hadfield’s state was a consequence of this injury.97  However, Erskine was forced to 
contend with Hale’s theory of partial insanity, which set the bar for responsibility at 
the understanding possessed by a fourteen year old.98  Even if the test of ability to 
distinguish right from wrong were applied, Hadfield had clearly understood that his 
act was wrong, as he planned it as a route to execution.  In Hadfield, Erskine 
abandoned the challenge of trying to fit his client within these legal rules, and instead 
attempted to show that Hale’s doctrine was too narrow.  He argued that very few 
defendants would fall within Hale’s expression, which he described as “a total 
deprivation of memory and understanding.”99  Erskine noted that a literal application 
of this rule would rule out any defendant who could remember his own name, that he 
was married or had children.  Since the courts had already excused people who fell 
outside this test, the threshold could not be literally applied.100  Erskine thus argued 
that the insanity defence should be broadened to include partial insanity based on 
delusion instead of understanding.  Hadfield’s acquittal on the grounds of insanity 
was theoretically significant because of this broader test of insanity.  However, 
Walker has argued that the acquittal rate remained roughly the same following the 
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decision.101  His research clearly suggests that Hadfield was less significant in the 
evolution of the insanity defence than is usually suggested.  Walker’s conclusion was 
a product of his social research into the circumstances of insanity trials.  The present 
essay, however, is concerned with the intellectual development of the defence.  The 
precedents that define the insanity defence were developed in a series of key trials, 
rather than in the larger number of smaller and less serious cases. 
 
The doctrine of partial insanity was further broadened in the trial of Edward Oxford 
in 1840.  Oxford had shot at the Queen as she rode past in her carriage, and had made 
no attempt to avoid capture and arrest.102  He had some papers in his possession that 
suggested he might have been a member of a group of young men who carried 
pistols and met in secret, although there was a strong suggestion that these were 
simply a fiction created by Oxford himself.103  The major obstacle for the defence 
was that the prosecution could argue that Oxford’s recent decision to purchase a pair 
of pistols indicated that he premeditated his crime.104  However, Oxford’s counsel 
were able to refer to earlier trials, including Hadfield, to show that premeditation was 
not necessarily an obstacle to a successful insanity defence.105  Various 
acquaintances of the defendant testified to his strange behaviour and to the history of 
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mental illness in his family.106  However, the evidence that was most relevant to 
partial insanity came from the medical witnesses.  The first doctor to testify, Dr Birt 
Davis, affirmed that the circumstances of the crime gave rise to a strong suspicion of 
insanity.  As noted in Chapter 1, the court challenged this evidence.  The bench 
asked incredulously whether he thought “every crime that is plainly committed is 
committed by a madman?”107  Judging insanity from the circumstances of the crime 
itself blurred the boundary between criminality and insanity.  The judges in Oxford 
were unsettled by the implications of Davis’s testimony, and saw it as a threat to the 
sanctity of individual criminal responsibility.  Legal authorities reacted with 
suspicion when confronted with a medical doctrine that conflated partial insanity and 
criminality.  Ray and Winslow were aware of this phenomenon, but some doctors 
were not. 
 
The test of insanity proposed by the medical witnesses in Oxford also challenged the 
legal principles of the period.  The medical witnesses were clear that the problem 
was one of self-control.  Borrowing from French psychiatric theory, Dr Hodgkin 
testified that Oxford’s insanity was a “lesion of the will”, or a “moral irregularity”.108  
Another medical expert, Dr Chowne, testified that he had often seen patients who 
possessed a strong impulse to commit specific bizarre acts, but who were aware of 
the strangeness of their impulses.  These ideas were similar to Ray’s extensive 
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discussion (also inspired by French theorists) in Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity 
that explained disease of the moral faculties and the resulting loss of self-control.109  
Despite the use of the term “moral”, these doctors were describing a form of insanity 
that affected a patient’s ability to control their own actions.  While a modern 
audience would associate morality and the knowledge of right and wrong, these 
medical experts associated “moral irregularity” with a diseased will.  This test of 
insanity focussed on the defendant’s self-control, or lack thereof.  The established 
legal test of knowledge of right and wrong presumed self-control and focussed 
instead on the defendant’s cognition and choices.  The prosecution summation in 
Oxford exemplified the traditional legal understanding of insanity.  The Solicitor-
General, who conducted the prosecution, emphasised that Oxford had never been 
treated as a maniac.  In addition, the medical evidence of subtle degrees of delusion 
was ignored in favour of a test of insanity that focussed on the defendant’s reason.110  
Lord Denman, one of the judges, summarised the evidence for the defence.  It was an 
unusual summation: he did not specifically mention the doctrine of partial insanity, 
and declared that the defendant would have to show delusion that prevented him 
from knowing the effect of his act.  Furthermore, even if forced by his “morbid 
desire” to commit the act of shooting, he would still be responsible if he knew the 
likely result.111  Finally, Denman emphasised the role of the jury, rejecting the idea 
that the medical experts had any special expertise, and noting also that the diagnosis 
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of insanity on the basis of the enormity of a crime alone would be an undesirable and 
dangerous rule.112  This situation served as the medico-legal context of the 
McNaughtan trial: a legal test of knowledge of right and wrong, or alternatively, the 
effect of the crime, both of which were in direct contrast to a medical test of self-
control.  The vital issue in McNaughtan was which of these tests would be become 
recognised legal doctrine. 
  
Given the narrow nature of the established legal principle, and McNaughtan’s 
knowledge that his act was wrong, the defence in McNaughtan was forced to argue 
for a broader test of partial insanity.  The prosecution, anticipating the defence of 
insanity, had attempted to uphold the right-wrong test of partial insanity.  The 
Solicitor-General insisted that a defendant would have to be unable to tell right from 
wrong in order to benefit from the doctrine.113  Cockburn had to challenge this test 
and broaden the definition of partial insanity.  He argued that the right-wrong test 
should be replaced by one of delusion alone.  He referred to Erskine’s argument in 
Oxford, where the barrister had claimed “delusions, therefore, where there is no 
frenzy or raving madness, is the true character of insanity.”114  He accordingly 
portrayed McNaughtan’s actions as those of a man who had delusions of persecution.  
He drew the jury’s attention to Ray’s claim that some madmen are aware of the 
distinction between good and evil, but are deluded about the nature of the specific act 
that they commit.115  Even more significantly, Cockburn relied on Ray to dismiss 
Lord Hale’s opinion that the understanding of a fourteen year old should prevent a 
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defendant from benefiting from the insanity defence.  In his Medical Jurisprudence 
of Insanity, Ray challenged this test, arguing that it was the product of a time when 
insanity was treated very differently.  In modern times, insanity was far more 
common and different degrees of delusional insanity were recognised.  Ray had 
contrasted the madhouses of Hale’s day with the asylums of his own, arguing that 
they were much better suited to the diagnosis and treatment of the insane: 
 
In the time of this eminent jurist, insanity was a much less frequent disease 
than it now is, and the popular notions concerning it were derived from the 
observation of those wretched inmates of mad-houses, whom chains and 
stripes, cold and filth, had reduced to the stupidity of idiot, or exasperated to 
the fury of a demon.  Those nice shades of the disease, in which the mind, 
without being wholly driven from its propriety, pertinaciously clings to 
some absurd delusion, were either regarded as something very different 
from real madness, or were too few, too far removed from the modern gaze, 
and too soon converted by bad management into the more active forms of 
the disease, to enter much into the general idea entertained of madness.116 
 
For Ray, medical expertise and asylum management had progressed to such a point 
that a failure to recognise partial insanity could only be regarded as old fashioned 
and out of date.  Modern medical experts and asylum keepers were well aware that 
partial insanity could exist, and had pioneered new methods of treatment and 
diagnosis.  As John Starrett Hughes has argued, Ray’s argument allowed Cockburn 
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to cast partial insanity as the discovery of a new generation of medical experts, who 
had greater experience in asylums and who were open to the subtleties of the 
disease.117  In doing so, he adopted these experts’ test of insanity, which focussed on 
delusion instead of the ability to tell right from wrong. 
 
However, Cockburn’s argument relied on more than a simple contrast between 
modern medical arguments and outdated legal ones.  He also used phrenological 
principle to support a broader definition of partial insanity and the abandonment of 
ancient legal rules.  “The mistake existing in ancient times,” he said, 
 
Which the light of modern science has dispelled, lay in supposing that in 
order that a man should be mad – incapable of judging right and wrong, or 
of exercising that self-control and dominion, without which the knowledge 
of right and wrong would become vague and useless – it was necessary that 
he should exhibit these symptoms which would amount to a total prostration 
of the intellect…118 
 
On one side of the balance, therefore, lay old legal ideas of right versus wrong and 
total insanity.  Modern science was on the other side, represented by some 
distinctively phrenological ideas: 
 
…whereas modern science has controvertibly established that any one of 
these intellectual and moral functions of the mind may be subject to separate 
disease, and thereby man may be rendered the victim of the most fearful 
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delusions, the slave of uncontrollable impulses impelling or rather 
compelling him to the commission of acts such as that which has given rise 
to the case now under your consideration.119 
 
The division of the mind into intellectual and moral functions and the irresistible 
control exerted by the mind were central to Cockburn’s argument.  These were, of 
course, ideas that were central to phrenology, and they appeared in Cockburn’s 
argument because of his acceptance of Ray’s Medical Jurisprudence.  A test of 
delusion implied some cognitive impairment, although as the quote above shows, 
Cockburn’s argument also hinted at a disease of the volition.  That is, the test was a 
hybrid of reasoning ability and self-control.  It embraced Ray’s test of intellectual 
insanity, which was indicated by delusions, and his test of moral insanity, with 
centred on self-control.  Although there are enough features of Ray’s book to 
establish that he was a firm believer in phrenology, it is more difficult to establish 
that Cockburn was aware of the source of his ideas.  As noted above, phrenology was 
not the only nineteenth century science that suggested that the mind was divided into 
individual faculties.  Regardless of this commonality, phrenology was the basis of 
Ray’s argument, and its role in shaping the McNaughtan defence indicates its place 
in mainstream nineteenth century science. 
 
Cockburn’s medical witnesses were, of course, in total agreement with his model of 
the mind and of partial insanity.  These witnesses were not all phrenologists, but 
many of their ideas were compatible with phrenology.  They favoured the same tests 
of partial insanity as the phrenologists.  For example, Dr Monro, manager of the 
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Bethlem mental asylum, observed that monomania (or partial moral insanity) could 
exist alongside sanity.  Furthermore, he believed that the ability to tell right from 
wrong was a poor test of insanity.120  He stated that 
 
I have frequently known a person insane upon one point exhibit great 
cleverness upon all others not immediately associated with his delusions.  I 
have seen clever artists, arithmeticians, and architects, whose mind was 
disordered on one point.  An insane person may commit an act similar to the 
one with which the prisoner is charged, and yet be aware that of the 
consequence of such an act.121 
 
Not only did Monro affirm that delusion was the best test in these situations, but 
agreed that some parts of the mind could be disordered and others sane.  The other 
medical witnesses also spoke of delusion, and not of the knowledge of right and 
wrong.122  In his Plea of Insanity, published in the year of the trial, Winslow also 
emphasised that the right-wrong test was inferior to one that emphasised delusion 
and the loss of self-control.123  When the judges stopped the trial, there was no doubt 
that delusion had won over the right-wrong test, and that partial insanity had been 
accepted as a legitimate legal doctrine.  The court had been convinced that the mind 
was divided into discrete faculties, each of which could be independently disordered, 
and that these faculties could exert an uncontrollable influence over the individual. 
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Although delusion was the test adopted by the defence and accepted by the court in 
McNaughtan, Isaac Ray did not believe that delusion was an exhaustive test of 
partial insanity.  He accepted that it could be a suitable criterion in some cases, such 
as where the intellect was diseased.124  He believed that the delusion criterion was a 
cognitive test that focussed on the intellect and reason.  Because phrenology made a 
distinction between the intellectual faculties and the moral sentiments, a disease of 
the moral part of the brain would require a different test.  Patients with partial moral 
mania might have no signs of delusion, but were still controlled by the physical 
abnormalities of their brain.125  A disease of the moral faculties was more difficult to 
diagnose, and Ray suggested that a doctor should consider the subject’s eccentricity, 
recent changes in behaviour, and any singular obsessions.126  Although Cockburn 
mentioned Ray’s account of partial moral mania in his defence of McNaughtan, he 
did not reproduce Ray’s argument in full.  Perhaps he felt that McNaughtan was 
suffering from a disease of the intellectual faculties, and that delusion was the 
appropriate diagnostic test.  It is more likely, however, that he felt that it was easier 
to prove McNaughtan’s delusion than prove a disease of the moral sentiments.  After 
all, McNaughtan’s delusion was clear to the entire court, and they were much more 
likely to accept that he was deluded than accept that his eccentricities should excuse 
his crime.  Certainly, it took the medical opinions of Ray, Monro, Winslow and the 
other doctors to convince the court that delusion was the appropriate test, but this test 
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had a fundamental compatibility with lay understandings of madness.  Delusion was 
easy for a layperson to spot and similar to the behaviour one would expect of a 
raving total maniac.  Cockburn relied on a medical model of insanity, and called 
medical witnesses to diagnose his client, but he was careful to ensure that his 
argument was acceptable to the judges and jury who did not share this medical 
perspective. 
 
Presented with Cockburn’s argument, and the concurring evidence of the medical 
experts, Chief Justice Tindal stopped the trial.  He observed that the medical 
evidence was all on the side of the defence, and practically directed the jury to return 
a verdict of not guilty on the grounds of insanity.127  This verdict caused some 
concern.  Newspapers published critical reports of the trial and verdict, particularly 
the role of the medical experts.  Even Queen Victoria herself expressed displeasure 
with the result.128  However, at least some phrenologists supported the verdict.  
Roger Cooter has noted that before McNaughtan’s trial, a number of phrenologists 
wrote to Lord Brougham, previously the Lord Chancellor, calling for McNaughtan’s 
pardon.  These phrenologists explicitly referred to the principles of their science in 
asserting McNaughtan’s irresponsibility.129  Unswayed by these arguments, the 
House of Lords debated the outcome of the trial and the dangers of the principles that 
had been established.  The Lords’ main concern was the appropriate test of partial 
insanity.  Although Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst stated that he believed there was no 
doubt as to the correct law, he felt it necessary to discuss – at length – the most 
famous cases of criminal insanity in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
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He concluded that the proper test of partial insanity was delusion combined with an 
inability to tell right from wrong.130  That is,  
 
If a man, labouring under some mental delusion, acts under the influence of 
that delusion, and the influence of the delusion is so powerful as to render 
him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, in that case he cannot be 
considered in law as responsible for his act.131 
 
This test echoed the one offered by McNaughtan’s prosecutors.  By incorporating the 
proviso that the defendant would have to be unable to tell right from wrong, the 
Lords were advocating for the narrower test of partial insanity.  Although the 
medical experts in McNaughtan had suggested that an understanding of right and 
wrong was irrelevant to insanity, the Lords were effectively undermining their 
opinions.  When combined with the Lords’ statements of regret that the trial had 
been concluded by the medical evidence, and not by a judicial summation,132 it is 
clear that the Lords were deeply troubled by the medical definition of exculpatory 
insanity.  The House of Lords debate and subsequent questions to the judges must be 
viewed as an attempt to narrow the doctrine of partial insanity in the wake of the 
McNaughtan trial. 
 
In order to resolve their concerns with the insanity defence, the Lords called the trial 
judges and their colleagues on the Supreme Court of Judicature to answer five 
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questions.  They employed a rarely used power of the House of Lords to ask the 
judges specific questions about the law of England.133  These questions concerned 
the test of partial insanity and the testimony that could be given by medical 
witnesses, among other things.  The first question related to the exculpatory effect of 
delusion, and specifically delusions relating to persecution.134  The second and third 
questions asked the judges to define the instructions that should be left to the jury in 
such a case.  The fourth question dealt with the law in a situation where a defendant 
was suffering from delusions relating to facts.  The final question related to the 
testimony of medical experts who had never examined the prisoner.  This question 
was a response to the courtroom role of Forbes Winslow.  He had never examined 
the defendant, but sat in the courtroom during the trial and was invited to give his 
opinion on the defendant’s state of mind.  This unusual procedure was one foci of the 
Lord’s ire, as it suggested that a medical expert without any special knowledge of the 
defendant would be entitled to make conclusions that usually belonged to the jury.  
The Lords’ questions reinforce the insights of their discussion in the House of Lords.  
They were concerned by the broad nature of the test accepted by the bench in 
McNaughtan, and also hoped to reduce the influence of medical witnesses in insanity 
trials. 
 
The judges’ responses to the Lords’ questions became the famous McNaughtan 
Rules, which codified the law of partial insanity in criminal cases.  The majority of 
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the judges declared that a person suffering from insane delusions of persecution 
could be found guilty if he or she knew that their act was against the law: 
 
A person labouring under partial delusions only, and not otherwise insane, 
who did the act charged with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, 
of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or wrong, or producing 
some public benefit, is punishable, if he knew at the time that he was acting 
contrary to the law of the land.135 
 
If it had been applied in the trial, this statement would have excluded McNaughtan 
from benefiting from the defence.  Although he was suffering from delusions, and 
believed that his action was justified, he knew that his act was against the law.  The 
judges had effectively reversed the implications of their decision to stop the trial.  
The judges also offered a compromise position regarding medical experts’ role in the 
courtroom, a position that was only partially compatible with the events of the 
McNaughtan trial.  They decided that a medical witness who had never seen the 
defendant before could not give his opinion of the defendant’s state of mind.  They 
stated that the defendant’s sanity or insanity was a question of fact, and was therefore 
a question for the jury alone.  However, they added the proviso that if the facts were 
admitted, then the question of the defendant’s state of mind was a question of 
science.  In such a situation, the medical witnesses would be able to give their 
opinion.136  This Rule was an intriguing response from a group of judges who were 
clearly under pressure from the House of Lords to narrow the scope of medical 
opinion in insanity trials.  The Lords had been critical of medical opinion in their 
                                                 
135 House of Lords, ‘Judges’ “Rules”’, p. 75. 
136 House of Lords, ‘Judges’ “Rules”’, p. 75. 
 57
recent debate, and yet the judges created a role for medical experts in making 
scientific conclusions from agreed facts.  This left room for medical experts to 
operate as they had in the McNaughtan trial, and offer opinions that had traditionally 
been the realm of the jury.  This Rule was a sign of the gradual switch from ideas of 
madness manifest in behavioural patterns towards an understanding of insanity that 
emphasised the special knowledge of medical men.  Similarly, the judges’ hybrid test 
was a reaction to the competing pressures of lay and medical explanations of 
insanity.  The McNaughtan Rules, and the indecision they express, were a product of 
a moment when the right to define insanity was passing from laypersons to medical 
experts. 
 
Eigen was correct to argue that phrenology had enormous relevance to partial 
insanity and doctrines of legal responsibility.137  Phrenology was determinist and 
materialist, but its explanation of partial insanity made it attractive to doctors and 
lawyers alike.  This attraction culminated in the McNaughtan trial, where it played a 
vital role in the successful defence argument.  Eigen searched the work of the leading 
phrenologists for a discourse on criminal responsibility, but Cockburn’s reliance on 
Ray’s Medical Jurisprudence shows that any investigation of the influence of 
phrenology on the law must include the work of the medico-legal experts who drew 
on the science.  Spurzheim and Combe were not being cited in courtrooms, but the 
medical theorists who followed them were.  However, Eigen has argued elsewhere 
that phrenology failed to make an explicit appearance in legal proceedings.138  He 
argues that even when phrenologists testified, they were aware that their ideas were 
too controversial to be seriously accepted by the court.  Eigen takes the absence of 
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terms such as “organs” as a sign that the medical experts who followed phrenology 
were deliberately withholding their phrenological arguments.  The reality is that 
phrenology had a more nuanced influence on medico-legal theory.  The doctors who 
brought phrenology into the courtroom were employing the underlying assumptions 
and philosophies of their science, rather than obvious phrenological language.  Eigen 
is correct, however, to argue that these phrenologists felt the need to hide the role of 
phrenology in their arguments.  Ray’s attempts to camouflage the phrenological 
aspects of his work demonstrate that phrenologists were participating in a process of 
self-regulation. 
 
Phrenology’s role in McNaughtan challenges the historian to resolve this science 
with the courts’ long-standing reliance on lay understandings of insanity.  As Arlie 
Loughnan has argued, the insanity defence continues to incorporate doctrines that 
allow the expression of lay understandings of insanity.139  It is difficult is to reconcile 
this observation with the authority vested in medical experts in famous cases such as 
McNaughtan.  Moments of agreement between lay and medical opinion express the 
transition between the competing models of insanity.  Even in the trial, with several 
medical witnesses willing to testify to McNaughtan’s intellectual and moral insanity, 
Cockburn preferred to emphasise a test of insanity that was explicable to both lay 
and medical participants.  In another sign that understandings of insanity were in 
flux, the judges, acting under the influence of the House of Lords, later reversed their 
acceptance of the phrenologists’ test of partial insanity.  Instead, they clung to the 
test of knowledge of right and wrong, applying a criterion that appealed to lawyers’ 
and lay jurors’ common sense.  On the other hand, there are elements of the Rules 
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that imply that the judges were not as resistant to phrenology as this chapter has 
suggested.  Weihofen argued that the Rules themselves were also influenced by 
phrenology.  He argued that the judges’ acceptance of the idea that a patient could be 
delusional in relation to some topics and not others (exemplified by the phrase “and 
not otherwise insane”) is evidence of their belief in the discrete faculties that were 
central to phrenology.140  Although Weihofen’s argument is attractive, it is important 
to note that the judges maintained the right-wrong test opposed by Ray and Winslow.  
Although the underlying principles of the Rules were compatible with phrenology, 
the judges had rejected the phrenologists’ arguments. 
 
The McNaughtan trial came at the end of a long period of gradual transformation of 
the law.  Partial insanity had been argued in a number of significant criminal trials, 
but was met with only limited success.  Hadfield was undoubtedly the watershed 
case prior to McNaughtan, as it represents a striking example of the acceptance of 
the doctrine of partial insanity.  However, McNaughtan went a step beyond the 
previous decisions.  In McNaughtan, Cockburn successfully argued for a broadening 
of the insanity defence to recognise partial insanity based on delusions, whether or 
not the defendant could tell right from wrong.  Medical experts, who thought that 
insanity should be diagnosed on the basis of delusion and lack of self-control, rather 
than reasoning ability, supported his test.  It was also a test that was supported by 
phrenology.  Phrenologists had emphasised the compartmentalisation of the mind 
and the power of delusions in a number of medico-legal works.  The division of the 
mind into separate organs was particularly important, because it helped to explain 
why a patient could be insane in relation to some topics and sane in relation to 
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others.  The defence in McNaughtan relied on both of these ideas.  They strove to 
overcome years of legal emphasis on personal responsibility and reason by appealing 
to medical ideas of materialism and determinism.  For a brief moment, phrenology 
had made its way into the legal arena.  Although the House of Lords attempted to 
quash these dangerous determinist ideas and the power that they gave to medical 
professionals, they were unable to erase partial insanity and medical opinion from 
the insanity defence. 
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Chapter 3: Phrenology and the Negotiation of Medico-Legal 
Expertise 
 
The medical and scientific communities accepted phrenology as a true science, and 
this led to its role in the McNaughtan trial.  As the previous chapters have shown, 
phrenological theory appeared in the trial because it functioned as a legitimation of 
medical expertise and as a way of explaining partial insanity.  However, the function 
of phrenology alone does not account for its role in McNaughtan.  It is also important 
to consider its significance to the participants in the trial.  Although some 
phrenologists approached the doctrine as a money-making enterprise, rather than as a 
bona fide science, this was only one aspect of the discipline.  There was also an elite, 
intellectual side to the science, which had much more in common with the original 
ideas of Gall and Spurzheim.  This respectability is the key to understanding 
phrenology’s role in the McNaughtan trial.  Phrenology appeared in the trial because 
it was an explanation of insanity and a philosophy of responsibility among doctors 
and intellectuals.  The historians who have denied a place for phrenology in legal 
history have generally looked for the popular form typified by head reading and 
charlatan lecturers.  Their approach ignores the multifaceted identity of the science, 
and this chapter begins the process of writing phrenology’s dual identities into the 
history of its relationship with the law. 
 
Historians who have studied the popularity of phrenology have identified two aspects 
to the discipline.  Phrenology had an intellectual or philosophical form, which was 
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dominated by the medical and non-medical professional elite.141  It also had a 
practical form, which emphasised the lessons that could be learnt from the study of 
the human skull.  This latter form was popular among laypersons with little or no 
education, but who were interested in vaguely scientific ideas and embraced 
phrenology’s potential to tell them about themselves.  An exploration of the role of 
phrenology in the law must recognise that the elite, respectable form of the discipline 
was much more likely to win an audience in the superior courts that defined legal 
doctrine.  The division of phrenology is an example of the negotiation of expert 
knowledge in the early nineteenth century.  It saw phrenology transformed and 
distilled into a theory that was palatable to the courts and to elite society.  This 
reinterpretation resulted in an emphasis on the intellectual form of the discipline.  
This is not to say that intellectual phrenology was uncontroversial: there were still 
many prominent and respected figures willing and eager to criticise it.  However, this 
was criticism directed at an equal: at an idea that was respectable but nevertheless 
objectionable.  It was different to the vitriol and ridicule directed at the practical 
phrenologists.  This chapter argues that including phrenology in the story of the 
McNaughtan trial provides a window into the interaction between expert medical 
knowledge and legal doctrine.  Disreputable ideas were excluded, but experts also 
modified their ideas to make them palatable to the legal authorities.  Through this 
process, scientific ideas – such as phrenology – could become lose their most 
recognisable characteristics, although the core concepts survived.  The best example 
of this negotiation and reinterpretation is the McNaughtan trial itself.  The first two 
chapters of this thesis have explained how phrenology was twisted and camouflaged 
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until it could appear in this famous English trial.  This chapter will explain why such 
a process was necessary, and charts its progress. 
 
Although McNaughtan was an English case, the discussion that follows incorporates 
developments in both Britain and the United States.  This conflation reflects the fact 
that phrenology was a transnational phenomenon.  Gall and Spurzheim, who were 
both born in Germany and lectured in Austria, Switzerland and France, influenced 
the science when it arrived in Britain.142  Spurzheim himself toured the United 
States, where he died.143  After Spurzheim’s death, the Scottish lawyer George 
Combe took up his mantle, and also lectured in America.144  From this point on, 
phrenology’s fortunes of on both sides of the Atlantic were linked.  After all, Isaac 
Ray, an American, found that his ideas were cited in an English courtroom to 
overturn the dictum of the famous Englishman Sir Matthew Hale.  This link is an 
excellent example of the power of phrenology to cross the borders between the two 
nations.  Not only is McNaughtan an example of the power of phrenology to 
influence legal doctrine, but it is also an example of American medical jurisprudence 
playing a role in the development of English law. 
 
The central tenets of phrenology, such as the localisation of brain function and the 
existence of discrete cerebral organs, have already been discussed.  These beliefs 
were popularised by Gall’s former student, J.G. Spurzheim.  John D. Davies, in his 
extensive history of phrenology in America, argued that Spurzheim subtly altered 
Gall’s theory.  He replaced the idea of essentially good and essentially bad faculties 
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with a model in which crime and insanity flowed from the abuse or indulgence of the 
faculties.  Davies believed that this change added a metaphysical element to 
phrenology, which contrasted to Gall’s focus on science and facts.145  This 
metaphysical tradition was continued in later phrenological works, such as George 
Combe’s Constitution of Man, first published in 1828.  In this work, Combe tried to 
prove the existence of specific faculties by demonstrating how they related to the 
natural world.146  For example, he argued that  
 
Cautiousness is given, and it is admirably adapted to the nature of the 
external world.  The human body is combustible, is liable to be destroyed by 
violence, to suffer injury from extreme wet and winds, &c; and it is 
necessary for us to be habitually watchful to avoid these sources of 
calamity.  Accordingly, Cautiousness is bestowed on us as an ever watchful 
sentinel, constantly whispering, “Take care.”147 
 
Combe then went on to consider the consequences of the existence of these faculties, 
and the natural moral laws that could be deduced from their discovery.148  These 
philosophical elements were present in phrenology practically from its very creation.  
Besides answering scientific questions about the brain, phrenology also equipped the 
practitioner to discuss metaphysical questions about the mind and the will.  This 
                                                 
145 Davies, Phrenology, pp. 8-9. 
146 George Combe, The Constitution of Man Considered in Relation to External 
Objects (Hartford: Silas Andrus and Son, 1850), created 2005, Making of America 
Books hosted by University of Michigan Library, 
<http://name.umdl.umich.edu/aca1611.0001.001>, viewed 25 September 2008, pp. 
14-16. 
147 Combe, Constitution of Man, <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/aca1611.0001.001>, 
p. 14. 
148 Combe, Constitution of Man, <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/aca1611.0001.001>, 
pp. 21-47. 
 65
tradition was continued by the elite societies formed for the discussion of 
phrenology, and it gave them the tools to grapple with the questions of delusion and 
will that were central to the insanity defence. 
 
Phrenology had social significance beyond its ability to explain mind, character and 
responsibility.  Roger Cooter has found that the average age of prominent 
phrenologists was much lower than the average age of anti-phrenologists.149  
Combining this phenomenon with his observation that most phrenologists were just 
launching their careers, and lacked the power and wealth of the anti-phrenologists, 
Cooter argues that phrenology provided an intellectual touchstone for an up-and-
coming generation of professionals.  The literary and philosophical societies in 
which phrenology thrived can be interpreted as fora for the expression of ideas that 
distinguished the participants from the economic elite.150  Steven Shapin’s study of 
the social significance of phrenology among the intellectual elites in Edinburgh 
reinforces Cooter’s observations.  Shapin argues that phrenology provided a vehicle 
for reformists who were outside the established social structure in Edinburgh.151  
However, Cooter has observed that by the 1840s, these new professionals who 
espoused phrenology had themselves made it into the elite, and therefore no longer 
required a unifying doctrine.152  Cooter’s argument has important implications for 
phrenology’s role in the medical profession, its subsequent attractiveness to theorists 
who were attempting to reform the legal system, and the eventual rejection of the 
McNaughtan verdict by the House of Lords.  It could explain why phrenologists 
were so attracted to a theory that had the potential to reform the way that criminals 
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were punished and asylums were run.  Phrenology gave its followers the theoretical 
basis required to rationalise the organisation of the legal system and the asylums, 
thereby sweeping out the traditions of the previous generation.  It also suggests that 
the House of Lords may have associated the McNaughtan verdict with the new 
generation of medical experts, and reacted negatively to the court’s implied 
acceptance of their ideas.  However, any attempt to establish a link between 
phrenological theory and the socio-economic status of its followers must recognise 
that phrenologists shaped their discipline just as much as the fundamentals of the 
doctrine appealed to their reforming spirit.  The definition of phrenology was a 
process of give and take, and both scientific content and professional autonomy 
played a role. 
 
Despite the philosophical and intellectual foundation of phrenology, the science also 
had a common-sense basis.  This aspect gave the discipline an appeal to a non-
medical and non-scientific audience.  Instead of employing a medical and technical 
explanation of the mind, phrenologists explained the faculties in a manner that did 
not assume that their audience possessed medical training.  For example, the 
propensity to destroy, or Destructiveness, could be readily understood by anyone 
who picked up a phrenology text or who listened to a lecture on the subject.  The 
names of the faculties might be unconventional – Philoprogenitiveness being a prime 
example – but even this faculty described an emotion that was as easy to comprehend 
as the love of one’s children.  Gall’s system should be compared to other theories of 
the brain and mind that were current in the 1840s, around the time of McNaughtan’s 
trial.  Robert Young has identified physiologists who believed that Gall had relied 
too heavily on metaphysics, and who encouraged strict physiological analysis 
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instead.  Their studies had stronger evidentiary and experimental foundations, and 
were less concerned with the philosophical implications of their work than 
contemporary phrenologists.153  This relationship between phrenology and other 
schools within the medical profession reveals the extent to which Gall’s theory had 
been reinterpreted.  His medical theories had been toned down, and replaced with a 
greater emphasis on metaphysics.  These changes made it much more attractive to 
laypeople and professionals who lacked medical training. 
 
This metaphysical element also added to the controversy surrounding phrenology.  
As a philosophy that offered a physical explanation of character, phrenology 
attracted criticism that it was determinist and anti-spiritualist.  G.N. Cantor has 
described the intellectual and philosophical debate between phrenologists and anti-
phrenologists in Edinburgh in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.  
Focussing on philosophical challenges to the science, he has identified a number of 
controversial issues.  On a theological level, phrenologists’ critics accused the 
followers of the science of denying the moral world, and suggested that phrenology 
was incompatible with Presbyterianism.154  Further controversy derived from the 
phrenologists’ claims that the brain was the organ of the mind, that dissection alone 
would never establish the function of the brain, and their emphasis on inherent 
character over environmental factors.155  Of course, some of the issues Cantor 
identifies were only relevant to interactions taking place in Edinburgh, where the 
Scottish common-sense school dominated the intellectual landscape.  As noted in the 
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chapters above, phrenologists in the world of medical jurisprudence could work 
alongside non-phrenologists, and often drew on each other’s studies.  As the century 
went on, phrenologists began to climb the social ladder and their theories became 
more respectable.  This respectability did not resolve the fundamental controversies 
that arose from the science’s physical model of human character, but it did enable 
phrenology to spread into medicine and the law. 
 
Phrenology’s accessibility led to popularity among those without any technical 
medical or scientific training.  Between 1839 and 1841, about one third of the 
membership of Phrenological Association in Britain who supplied data on 
occupation were doctors.156  The vast majority of the rest of the members were 
professional figures or from the middle and upper classes: merchants, writers, clerks, 
and schoolteachers.  Almost one in ten were lawyers, and one of the greatest British 
phrenologists, George Combe, was a lawyer.157  Although intellectual phrenology 
was certainly of interest to medical experts, not all of its followers were doctors.  
More importantly, the Phrenological Association and the intellectual followers of 
phrenology represented just one part of the broader phrenological movement.  There 
was also a strong sense of the everyday value of phrenology, particularly in America.  
Itinerant lecturers, who travelled from town to town giving brief talks on the doctrine 
and measuring heads for a fee, spread this practical form of the doctrine.158  The 
audience did not come to hear about a science they could not understand; they came 
to hear about their own character in terms that were relevant to their everyday lives.  
Phrenology was certainly a science, in the sense that a science involves specialised 
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knowledge and measurement techniques.  But if it was a science, it was one that was 
particularly explicable to a lay audience.  Phrenology had an appeal among those 
who did not necessarily understand anatomy or mental illness.  The ease with which 
the phrenological faculties could be understood made it possible for phrenology to 
take root in a non-medical audience, although it maintained the scientific and 
medical flavour inherited from its founders. 
 
In the US, travelling lecturers drew on the non-medical appeal of phrenology and 
repackaged it for a lay audience.  They referred to the faculties to explain practical 
problems and everyday situations.  They addressed health, family, religion and 
marriage, among other topics, all from a phrenological perspective.  They aimed to 
turn a profit, of course, and managed to do so by reading heads after their lectures.  
John D. Davies dates the emergence of practical phrenology to 1833, when the 
Fowler brothers began to travel around north-eastern America lecturing and 
measuring heads for a fee.159  This form of phrenology most susceptible to ridicule, 
and was the furthest from true science as we imagine it today.  The practitioners were 
not medical experts, or even professional men, and in many cases were suspected of 
being travelling charlatans without any real phrenological training.160  Davies has 
collected a number of examples of phrenologists travelling with freak shows and 
misrepresenting their identity and qualifications.161  He also noted George Combe’s 
fear that these lecturers would ruin the respectable image of phrenology.  While 
phrenology had a wide audience outside the medical profession, this popularity came 
at the expense of a split between intellectual and practical practitioners. 
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The intellectual or philosophical form of phrenology took root among asylum 
managers and doctors.  However, this process involved integration and reconciliation 
with existing, acceptable ideas, and the most obvious features of phrenology were 
sometimes lost.  This renegotiation of the content and meaning of phrenology laid 
the foundation for its incorporation into the legal system.  As noted above, medical 
practitioners were attempting to create a consensus that only they had the expertise 
necessary to diagnose, control and treat the mentally ill.162  In his study of 
phrenology’s influence among asylum managers, Roger Cooter noted that some of 
the most distinguished asylum managers of the early nineteenth century supported 
phrenology.163  Cooter explains medical asylum managers’ support for phrenology 
by suggesting that the science allowed them to argue that the treatment of the insane 
required a medical expert.  If madness had a physical cause, then it was logical that a 
physician would be required to treat it.164  In fact, if restraint were abandoned under 
the new regime of moral treatment, then more efficient forms of diagnosis and 
control would be required.  The phrenologically trained doctor could exert this 
control through an understanding and utilisation of the phrenological faculties.165  
Some asylum managers accepted phrenology, but saw no need to acknowledge their 
adherence to the discipline, nor utilise its practical form when diagnosing insanity.  
Instead, they accepted its fundamental concepts, such as the division of the mind into 
discrete faculties, without measuring their patients’ skulls.166  This choice provides a 
contrast between the different strands of the science.  While practical phrenology 
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was popular with a lay audience because it provided an easy-to-understand guide to 
the brain and character, medical experts referred to their understanding of intellectual 
phrenology to bolster their claims of professional knowledge. 
 
Penal reform was another opportunity for interaction between philosophical 
phrenology and the legal system.  The science had important implications for the 
confinement, classification and rehabilitation of criminals.  It was not unusual for 
Gall and Spurzheim to make a trip to a prison in order to examine the inmates and 
attempt to predict their crimes.  Studying a violent criminal with a large 
Destructiveness would help to find the organ in ordinary subjects.167  This interest 
was often reciprocated, with some prison wardens following phrenological ideas in 
the administration of their prisons. In 1846, Eliza Farnham, head matron of the 
women’s prison at Sing Sing, edited and re-published a work entitled Rationale of 
Crime.  It was a reprint of Marmaduke B. Sampson’s Treatise on Criminal 
Jurisprudence Considered in Relation to Cerebral Organization.  In this work, she 
combined Sampson’s account of phrenology with her own experiences at the head of 
a prison.  Farnham’s notes reveal that phrenological principle shaped her attitude 
towards insanity and responsibility.  For example, she believed the phrenological 
faculties cause criminality, although she held out hope that treatment was possible: 
 
How many…are born to the inheritance of propensities whose solicitations 
for criminal indulgence know no restraints?  The force of the physical law is 
the same in the case of each set of faculties.  If their organs act, the emotion, 
desire or feeling, which they produce, must be experienced…It is not my 
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design to teach that crime is inevitable, but that the causes which lead to it 
often are, so far as the individual criminal is concerned, and that society 
ought to direct its treatment to causes instead of effects.168 
 
Farnham’s belief that the faculties caused crime evoked a sympathetic attitude 
towards criminals.  She believed that crime was the responsibility society as whole, 
whose members should discourage crime through the proper treatment of criminality 
and insanity.  Farnham’s work lies firmly within the philosophical tradition of 
phrenology.  She was following the tradition of Spurzheim and Combe in proposing 
phrenological solutions to criminality, rather than offering phrenology as a means of 
assessing the character of individual patients.  Farnham’s arguments engaged with 
the intellectual strand of phrenology.  Of the two forms of phrenology, intellectual 
phrenology had a stronger connection to the legal system, as demonstrated by its 
audience in asylums and prisons. 
 
Philosophical phrenologists were also enjoying a growing role in medical 
jurisprudence relating to the civil law.  Wills were often challenged on the basis of 
the testator’s alleged insanity at the time the will was made.  These disputes were 
another opportunity for medical experts to become involved in the law, and 
sometimes they brought phrenological ideas with them.  Just as asylum managers 
and medical experts were called as witnesses in criminal trials, they were also asked 
for an assessment of capacity in civil cases.  This rarely involved an examination of 
the testator’s skull or brain: this would be much too crude for a professional medical 
witness, and at any rate, the philosophical phrenologists held that disease of the 
                                                 
168 Farnham, Rationale of Crime, p. 28 (note). 
 73
faculties was not detectable via autopsy.169  Instead, medical experts who drew on 
phrenology used it to answer controversial questions of medical jurisprudence.  
Ray’s work is a premier example.  He argued that civil responsibility should be 
abrogated in cases of moral mania if the act in question, such as making a will, came 
within the realm of the topics on which the patient was diseased.  He cited cases of 
famous, intelligent people who had suffered from some strange delusion or belief, 
but who nonetheless possessed perfectly normal judgment.170  Once again, Ray’s 
belief in discrete mental organs had influenced his theory of insanity.  His proposed 
rule of civil responsibility in cases of partial moral mania relied on the core beliefs of 
philosophical phrenology, such as the division of the brain into separate faculties.  
The phrenologists who shaped legal doctrine drew on the underlying philosophy of 
their discipline, instead of its practical aspect. 
 
Phrenologists within the medico-legal community hid the influence of the science on 
their work.  The doctrine was far from universally accepted and there were journals 
and experts willing to attack the science throughout its history.  Some of these 
criticisms were based on a fear that materialism would destroy human responsibility, 
and some emphasised the untrustworthy nature of the lecturers who espoused 
practical phrenology.171  John Starrett Hughes, in his comprehensive biography of 
Isaac Ray, described Ray’s unwillingness to publicly and explicitly endorse 
phrenology.  Hughes believes that Ray was trying to avoid the negative connotations 
of the science.  He had decided that it was better to ensure that his model of insanity 
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was accepted, rather than attempt to further phrenology’s cause by citing it 
explicitly.172  Ray did not mention phrenology by name in the Treatise, but he did 
refer to a mysterious persecuted science that he believed could completely reform the 
treatment of the mentally ill.  He lamented that 
 
The only metaphysical system of modern times, which professes to be 
founded on the observation of nature, and which really does explain the 
phenomena of insanity, with a clearness and verisimilitude, that strongly 
corroborate its proofs, was so far from being joyously welcomed, that it is 
still confined to a sect, and is regarded by the world at large, as one of those 
strange vagaries, in which the human mind has sometimes loved to 
indulge.173 
 
This “metaphysical system” was phrenology, and although Ray clearly believed in 
the value of the science, he was so wary of the consequences of an association with it 
that he avoided mentioning it by name.  Although he utilised phrenological 
principles, he realised that if he were to explicitly declare his support for phrenology 
then his book would be associated with head reading and fall victim to the moral and 
philosophical criticisms of the science.  Ray’s subsequent career suggests that his 
decision to withhold explicit support for phrenology was a wise decision.  Ray 
appeared as a witness in at least one trial, and testified that the right versus wrong 
test was flawed.  He also argued that some maniacs are unable to resist criminal 
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action.174  His role as a medical expert suggests that not all of Ray’s contemporaries 
were necessarily philosophically opposed to phrenology.  Indeed, Hughes notes that 
some lawyers were very excited by Ray’s ideas, and were fully aware of their 
phrenological foundations.175  Ray had found some legal supporters, who were even 
more interested in his ideas because they represented a nexus between phrenology 
and jurisprudence.  But these supporters were ardent believers in phrenology 
themselves.  What of the legal authorities who were not phrenologists?  How did 
Ray’s ideas appear in a trial as significant as McNaughtan’s, when none of the 
lawyers were phrenologists? 
 
Legal authorities considered Ray’s ideas because he had deliberately altered them to 
make them palatable to a courtroom audience.  McNaughtan was a single moment in 
phrenology’s split into intellectual and practical forms of the science.  The role of 
phrenology in McNaughtan was the result of negotiation between medical expertise 
and legal authority; a process exemplified by Ray’s Medical Jurisprudence of 
Insanity.  It was a period during which medical experts were beginning to appear 
more frequently in insanity trials.176  Not only were they appearing more frequently, 
but they were also beginning to challenge lay understandings of manifest madness.  
Doctors were given the task of diagnosing insanity using medical expertise, rather 
than relying on the obvious signs of insanity brought to the courtroom by lay 
witnesses.177  Ray’s incorporation of phrenology was a step in this process.  He was a 
member of a profession that was engaged in a struggle over the correct definition of 
insanity, and realised that his ideas remained controversial.  In order to manage this 
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controversy, he declined to mention the foundation of his ideas by name.  Instead, 
phrenology played a vital yet unstated role in his work, which flowed into 
Cockburn’s courtroom argument.  For example, as shown in Chapter 2, Cockburn 
relied on Ray’s theories to support his argument that the proper legal test of partial 
insanity should be a test of delusion, rather than a test of knowledge of right and 
wrong.178  Neither Ray nor Cockburn explicitly declared that this test relied on a 
phrenological conception of mind, but in reality, Ray’s theory rested on 
philosophical phrenology.  Its appearance in McNaughtan shows that his ideas were 
acceptable, although phrenology was still controversial.  That is, phrenology had 
negative connotations, but the content of the discipline could sway a court.  
Ironically, Ray’s willingness to abandon explicit references to the science was the 
key to its eventual adoption. 
 
Phrenology’s role in legal cases was not limited to the hidden influence of the 
philosophical side of the science.  Practical phrenology also appeared in some 
courtrooms.  This phenomenon was more common in the United States, although it 
was still a rare event.  In 1834, a young boy was accused of a violent crime, and was 
examined by a number of phrenologists before his trial, including Isaac Ray.  The 
boy’s lawyer was a keen adherent of phrenology who attempted to use the case to 
introduce phrenology to the law.  This argument would be based on a practical 
phrenologist’s diagnosis of a large organ of Destructiveness, and the lawyer intended 
to argue that this abrogated the boy’s responsibility.  This argument was distinct 
from the arguments of medico-legal experts such as Ray.  Ray used phrenology to 
propose a theory of insanity, while this lawyer wanted to use the science to diagnose 
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individual cases of insanity.  Despite this distinction, Ray was disappointed when the 
defence case was unsuccessful.179  Phrenology did not always take such a central role 
in criminal trials.  In 1857, the New York Times carried a phrenologist’s description 
of the head of a prisoner awaiting trial for murder.  The correspondent did not refer 
to questions of will or responsibility, but instead preferred to judge guilt and 
innocence using practical phrenological techniques.180  This evidence encourages a 
reassessment of Joel Peter Eigen’s claim that phrenology did not make an explicit 
appearance in the courtroom.181  It appeared in American courts and coverage of 
American trials.  However, despite the transnational nature of phrenology, England 
and the United States diverge on this point.  The examples above indicate that 
practical phrenology was closer to the law in the United States than it ever was in 
England, and work to contrast the two legal systems and their relationships to 
practical phrenology.  Furthermore, Eigen may have been correct when he argued 
that references to phrenological organs were unacceptable to the courts.  Eigen 
believed that phrenological language was too unfamiliar to the lawyers and jurors.  It 
is more likely that medical witnesses were discouraged from discussing practical 
phrenology because of the courts’ unwillingness to accept a comprehensive method 
of assessing insanity that would supplant the jury’s role.  As the debate in the House 
of Lords demonstrates, some authorities resisted medicine’s power to invalidate lay 
understandings.  Practical phrenologists eschewed the philosophy behind the science 
in favour of applying its insights to the everyday situations around them.  This 
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phenomenon extended to the determination of guilt and innocence.  However, the 
Lords’ response to the outcome in McNaughtan emphasises the limits that could be 
placed on the ability of medical experts to challenge the jury’s role in deciding guilt, 
innocence, sanity and insanity. 
 
The contrast with practical phrenology illustrates the part intellectual phrenology 
played in the McNaughtan trial, and its role in English professional society.  
Cockburn did not ask his medical witnesses to measure McNaughtan’s head, nor did 
he refer to phrenology by name.  The doctrine had a more subtle influence on his 
argument.  This episode reflects the nature of intellectual phrenology.  It was a 
science that possessed links with other philosophies of the mind and remained 
theoretically accessible to those outside the medical community.  Intellectual 
phrenologists did not see the point in head reading, and instead offered theories of 
human will and responsibility.  Their science was exactly what a defence lawyer 
would look for in a medical theory: a discipline that offered a broader definition of 
exculpatory insanity, but which would not challenge the judge and jury to the extent 
that they would reject the philosophical underpinnings of the theory.  This form of 
phrenology was subtle and theoretically acceptable.  In the decades preceding the 
McNaughtan trial, it had been widely and wildly popular among medical and 
professional intellectuals.  It had then been incorporated into medical theory, which 
gave phrenological ideas a life that lasted long after the obvious signs of the doctrine 
had disappeared.  It is far from certain that Cockburn or Tindal realised that the 
argument in McNaughtan owed its medico-legal theory to phrenology.  Nevertheless, 
Ray’s ideas provided a bridge for phrenological philosophy to make its way into the 
English criminal law. 
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Conclusion 
 
Phrenology shaped the arguments made by the defence in the McNaughtan trial.  
Recognising the role of phrenological ideas – albeit a subtle and camouflaged one – 
encourages a reinterpretation of the interaction between the science and the legal 
system in the early nineteenth century.  While some historians have looked for 
obvious signs of phrenology in legal proceedings, their approach ignores the 
multifaceted and negotiated status of the science.  Because of the process through 
which phrenology was translated into medical jurisprudence, and the controversial 
status of the practical form of the doctrine, there was no significant nexus between 
the law and practical phrenology.  Instead, only the respectable, intellectual aspect of 
the science played a role in the law. 
 
Phrenology was incorporated into the law because it functioned in two ways that 
were very attractive to medico-legal theorists and defence lawyers.  The first useful 
function was its power to legitimate medical diagnoses of insanity.  Its power to do 
so was a product of its physical explanation of character.  This foundation meant that 
it could be used to encourage the legal authorities to accept a doctor’s diagnosis of 
insanity.  McNaughtan’s defence counsel were attracted to the science because it 
allowed them to challenge lay understandings of insanity.  Their ability to do so was 
vital when their client exhibited behaviour that a lay observer would interpret as a 
clear sign of sanity.  Phrenology was popular at a time when medical experts began 
to play a greater role in the courtroom diagnosis of insanity, and in which technical 
explanations of madness supplanted lay visions of manifest madness.  Of course, this 
is not to say that manifest madness disappeared entirely: the obvious signs of 
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insanity still appeared in lay witnesses’ accounts of the defendant’s crime, and were 
a precondition for the decision to raise the insanity defence.  Nevertheless, medical 
experts and their ideas of insanity were playing a greater role in insanity trials, and 
the physical basis of phrenology allowed them to argue that a physician should 
provide the final diagnosis of insanity. 
 
The second important function of phrenology was as an explanation of the 
phenomenon of partial insanity.  Because phrenology explained mental phenomena 
by referring to discrete organs of the brain, it could account for some defendants’ 
ability to reason and function while also exhibiting delusion on specific topics.  
Phrenologists argued that the phrenological faculties could account for this strange 
behaviour, because the faculties relating to the obsession were diseased while the rest 
of the brain was healthy.  The rise of phrenology was linked to the recognition of this 
form of insanity as a bona fide excuse for crime.  While it is difficult to argue that 
phrenology caused the acceptance of partial insanity as a sufficient excuse for crime, 
the phrenological idea of discrete faculties gave physicians and defence lawyers the 
tools to legitimate this form of insanity in the courtroom.  In the McNaughtan trial, 
the medical testimony played a particularly important role in persuading the bench to 
stop the trial.  After a difficult birth, the concept of partial insanity had arrived in a 
form that was palatable to the court.  The response of the House of Lords to the 
verdict complicates this picture, and suggests that even after the trial, there was still 
substantial disagreement regarding the extent to which medical accounts of insanity 
should be permitted to dominate insanity trials.  Despite the reaction of the House of 
Lords and the watering down of the verdict in the McNaughtan Rules, it was clear 
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that phrenology had begun to influence the way insanity was understood and 
represented in the courtroom. 
 
The final element to phrenology’s role in the law was the discipline’s status as a 
respectable, if controversial, scientific theory.  Phrenology had a multifaceted 
identity, which included both a philosophical and intellectual element and a practical 
element.  The intellectual elites considered the practical form of phrenology 
dangerous and unscientific, while it had substantial appeal to a lay audience who 
wanted to understand their own character and mind.  Although the functional 
elements of phrenology contributed to its appeal, the doctrine still had to be accepted 
by the elite legal authorities.  Thus, practical phrenology, and the practice of head-
reading, were not accepted in the highest courts.  Although it appeared in some trials, 
and in the coverage of some cases, practical phrenology did not take root as a tool for 
the diagnosis of insanity or the assessment of guilt and innocence.  Instead, the 
explanatory and metaphysical power of intellectual phrenology led this form of the 
science to play a role in the medical definition of insanity.  At a time when the 
medical profession was playing a greater role in insanity trials, it was just a short step 
from the major works of medical jurisprudence into actual legal proceedings. 
 
This account of the interaction between phrenology, law and medical expertise are 
consistent with other historians’ observations of the nineteenth-century development 
of these three bodies of knowledge.  Medical experts’ determination to control 
asylums and to contribute to the definition of insanity made certain legitimating ideas 
very attractive to this audience.  Asylum managers’ adoption and adaptation of 
phrenology provided a vehicle for phrenological ideas to influence the legal system.  
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This process has been explored by Scull and Cooter, who conclude that medical 
experts were eager to accept ideas that furthered their own influence over the 
diagnosis and treatment of insanity.182  Phrenology’s power to explain partial 
insanity, and the attractiveness of the doctrine that resulted from this explanatory 
power, has been observed by both Weihofen and Eigen, albeit in the context of 
broader studies of the insanity defence.183  This thesis offers a detailed analysis of the 
attraction and function of phrenology in the law, and explores its role specifically 
within the McNaughtan trial.  Finally, this thesis draws on the division of phrenology 
into practical and intellectual strands, proposed by the seminal accounts of the 
discipline.184  The result of the integration of these three areas of scholarship, 
combined with a detailed analysis of the defence argument in McNaughtan, is a 
clearer picture of phrenology’s subtle role in the development of legal doctrine. 
 
This account of the development of the insanity defence suggests that medical ideas 
were not easily incorporated into the law, and that lay understands of insanity 
maintained their power well into the nineteenth century.  Dana Rabin has argued that 
lay understandings of responsibility began to make way for medical and legal 
definitions of insanity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.185  Martin 
Wiener, in his discussion of the emerging power of science and medicine to control 
and diagnose, emphasises the relationship between the content of medical theories of 
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insanity and a fear of the diseased will in the mid nineteenth century.186  Roger 
Smith, in his comprehensive study of the interaction of medicine and the criminal 
law in the nineteenth century, argues that phrenology “served as a linguistic and 
conceptual bridge in the transition to physicalist views.”187  This thesis has shown 
that Smith was correct to argue that phrenology was a stepping-stone between lay 
understandings of insanity and the medical theories that were beginning to replace 
them.  The defence in McNaughtan emphasised a test with appeal to both lay and 
medical participants, and the science itself served as both a legitimation of medical 
expertise and a means for laypeople to participate in metaphysical debate.  However, 
this thesis also suggests that the process of medicalisation of the definition of 
insanity identified by these three historians was not a smooth one.  Instead, 
understandings of insanity were negotiated between lay, medical and legal 
participants.  Even phrenology, despite all its lay appeal, was reinterpreted and 
concealed before its core scientific ideas could be incorporated into legal doctrine. 
 
This analysis shows that a study of the power of scientific ideas in a legal context 
must be sensitive to the cultural significance of an idea, as well as its functional 
power.  An argument about the role of phrenology in the law would be incomplete 
without a study of the significance of the different strands of phrenology to different 
audiences.  It also shows that an analysis of the utility of scientific ideas in a legal 
context must be sensitive to unstated influences on the work of individual theorists.  
In Ray’s work, phrenology was hidden because he realised that his faith in 
phrenology could taint his conclusions.  Phrenology had been camouflaged, but the 
logical conclusions of the science survived this process intact.  From Ray’s work, it 
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was a short step to playing a fundamental role in the defence argument in 
McNaughtan.  Phrenology’s role in the insanity defence was the result of a subtle 
process of concealment and negotiation, rather than an outright acceptance of the 
practices of the science. 
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